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Textualism's Failures: A Study of
Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions
Daniel J. Bussel 53 Vand. L. Rev. 887 (2000)
Professor Bussel presents new empirical evidence bearing on the
efficacy of textualism as a method of statutory interpretation. Bank-
ruptcy cases subsequently overruled by statute are compared with
randomly selected decisions of the federal courts of appeals interpreting
the Bankruptcy Code. The overruled cases are much more likely to
adopt textualist methods of interpretation (p <.001). Although the
study is limited to bankruptcy decisions superseded by amendments to
the Bankruptcy Code 1978-1998 (N=58), the results have meaningful
implications for theory and practice in interpreting statutes outside the
bankruptcy field. If rational and efficient development and admini-
stration of complex statutory schemes in a manner consistent with
democratically selected policies is the primary goal of interpretation,
then this evidence supports judicial reconsideration of textualism and
should reinforce pragmatists' commitment to pragmatic interpretation.
Analysis of legislatively overruled bankruptcy decisions also lends
insight into other variables (including court, region, age, prevailing
party, and chapter) associated empirically or theoretically with statu-
tory overruling and the efficacy of legislative error-correction by
amendment.
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When Moses ascended on high, he found the Holy One, blessed be He, engaged in fixing
crowns (decorative markings) to the letters (of the Torah). Said Moses: "Lord of the
Universe, who stays Your hand?" (i.e. is there anything lacking in the Torah so that
additions are necessary?) He answered, 'There will arise a man at the end of many
generations, Akiba ben Joseph by name, who will expand upon each decorative mark-
ing heaps and heaps of laws."'
Judges and legal scholars are engaged in a contentious, wide-
ranging, and long-running debate over methods of statutory interpre-
tation. Stripping the debate of some of its nuance without misrepre-
senting its essence, there are two camps: the "textualists" and the
"pragmatists." Cass Sunstein recently argued that the question of in-
terpretive method should be considered in light of evidence whether
textualist methods work better or worse than pragmatic ones.2 To
date, however, only limited empirical evidence has been systematically
brought to bear on this question.3
1. Menahot 29b as translated and quoted in ELIOT N. DORFF & ARTHUR ROSETT, A LIVING
TREE: THE ROOTS AND GROWTH OF JEWISH LAW 196 (1988).
2. See Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
636, 656-61 (1999); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statu-
tory Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1999) (responding to Sunstein); Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretation, Empiricism, and the Closure Problem, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 698 (1999) (responding
to Sunstein).
3. Professor Zeppos analyzed Supreme Court decisions for interpretive method and showed
that as a descriptive matter the Supreme Court, consistently over the course of the twentieth
century, has used a broad range of interpretive sources that cannot be accurately described as
textualist or originalist. His empirical work, however, does not directly attempt to compare the
quality of textualist and pragmatic interpretation. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority
in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1091-1120 (1992); see
also Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A
Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999) (proposing an alternative conception of the role
of custom in commerce and in commercial law); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Un-
known Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1551-52 (1998) [hereinafter Eskridge, Textualism] (citing
scholarly inquiry into the effects of textualism in a variety of substantive areas); James P. Nehf,
Textualism in the Lower Courts: Lessons from Judges Interpreting Consumer Legislation, 26
RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1994) (examining how courts have interpreted state consumer-protection laws).
In the bankruptcy field, there are two comprehensive surveys and analyses of use of interpretive
methods at the Supreme Court level, but to assess the comparative quality of textualist deci-
sionmaking, the authors rely on their bankruptcy expertise and traditional legal argument
rather than objective indicators. See Robert M. Lawless, Legisprudence Through a Bankruptcy
Lens: A Study in the Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (1996); Charles
Jordan Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds and Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy
Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 823 (1991). Cf Robert K. Rasmus-
sen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 535 (1993). Professor Eskridge has the most ambitious contribution. He at-
tempted to collect all federal statutory decisions knowingly overridden by the 90th through 101st
Congresses and to analyze the subset of those cases decided by the Supreme Court for, inter alia,
interpretive method. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statu-
tory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overriding]; see
also infra notes 60 (comparing Eskridge methodology to this study), 76, 117, 120 (comparing
Eskridge findings to this study).
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This Article presents new empirical evidence gleaned from
twenty years of interpretation of the United States Bankruptcy Code
on the question of the comparative efficacy of textualism as a method
of statutory interpretation. Analysis of bankruptcy decisions super-
seded by amendments to the Code indicates that cases adopting tex-
tualist methods of statutory interpretation are disproportionately
found within the universe of cases overruled by statute. To the extent
that the goal of statutory interpretation is the rational and efficient
development and administration of complex statutory schemes in a
manner consistent with policy goals democratically selected,4 this evi-
dence should cause textualists to reconsider their allegiance to their
method. It should also reinforce pragmatists' commitment to prag-
matic interpretation.
Independently of the textualism/pragmatism debate, analysis
of legislatively overruled decisions also gives insight into the types of
bankruptcy decisions that get overruled by statute. Additional study
of overruled cases in this and other statutory areas may produce valu-
able policy recommendations for judges and policymakers.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I describes the de-
bate over textualism and illustrates the competing modes of interpre-
tation using well-known bankruptcy cases decided by the Supreme
Court. Part II describes the research design and results from a statis-
tical analysis of the method of interpretation adopted in fifty-eight
bankruptcy decisions subsequently overruled by statute. Finally,
Part III presents significant subsidiary findings, independent of inter-
pretive method, derived from analysis of the overruled cases. A short
conclusion follows.
I. THE TEXTUALISM DEBATE
Judge Learned Hand observed that "it is one of the surest in-
dexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress
4. See Stephen G. Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 845, 847 (1992). Justice Breyer writes:
I assume that law itself is a human institution, serving basic human or societal needs. It
is therefore properly subject to praise, or to criticism, in terms of certain pragmatic val-
ues, including both formal values, such as coherence and workability, and widely shared
substantive values, such as helping to achieve justice by interpreting the law in accor-
dance with the "reasonable expectations" of those to whom it applies.
Id.; cf. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach To Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 485 (1997)
('Iost legal scholars, judges, and legislators regard law-related systems as purposeful, and they
do not hesitate to attribute to laws goals or purposes, even ones distinct from the goals that the
legislators who enact them may have had in mind.!).
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out of the dictionary."' The late respected Judge Hand notwithstand-
ing, a fashion in statutory interpretation has arisen in the land, predi-
cated upon heavy reliance on the dictionary. The textualists hold, oft-
times harangue, that legal texts have a meaning that is to be dis-
cerned without the aid of any confusing legislative history, other ex-
trinsic evidence of legislative intent, historical background, or most
especially, consideration of the social consequences of one interpreta-
tion or another.
Debate over interpretive methods has been a central issue in
code-based legal systems at least from the time of Justinian6 to the
modern civil law systems of continental Europe and Latin America.7
Debate over statutory interpretation within the common law stretches
back to Coke and beyond.' The literature on interpretation is, as one
might expect given this ancient and universal pedigree, enormous.'
Like textualism, the pragmatic school of statutory interpreta-
tion, which has dominated American jurisprudence during most of the
twentieth century, generally focuses first on statutory text and con-
text. Pragmatists, however, go further and consider sources outside
the text in order to give concrete meaning to the statute in particular
circumstances. Traditionally, these nontextual sources include legisla-
tive history, pre-enactment law, and other circumstantial evidence of
legislative intent examined with reference to the comparative policy
implications of various interpretations."0 This tradition is identified in
5. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945). Compare Pa-
cific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage Co., 442 P.2d 641, 643-44 (Cal. 1968) (suggesting
the judicial belief in the possibility of perfect verbal expression "is a remnant of a primitive faith
in the inherent potency and inherent meaning of words"), with E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning"
in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 965 (1967) ("Once it is recognized that all language is
infected with ambiguity and vagueness, it is senseless to ask a court to determine whether par-
ticular language is 'ambiguous' or 'vague' as opposed to 'plain.'").
6. Amusingly, Justinian's Code expressly forbade further interpretation. As Benjamin
Cardozo remarked, this early anti-interpretation legislation is remembered only for its futility.
See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 18 (1921).
7. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
95-103 (1994) (comments of Mary Ann Glendon).
8. See, e.g., Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke Rep. 114a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 647-48 (KB. 1610).
9. For an entree and good overview of the authorities, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY 513-631 (2d ed. 1995). For an engaging literary exploration of legal interpreta-
tion issues, see generally JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984).
10. Professors Eskridge and Frickey describe this "practical reasoning" approach to statu-
tory interpretation as "eclectic." William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpre-
tation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 321-22 (1990) ("When practitioners give
advice to clients about what a statute means. .. [t]hey look at the text of the relevant statutory
provisions, any legislative history that is available, the context in which the legislation was en-
acted, the overall legal landscape, and the lessons of common sense and good policy.').
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the bankruptcy caselaw with such cases as Kelly v. Robinson,"1 which
exempted criminal restitution orders from the Chapter 7 discharge
notwithstanding statutory language limiting nondischargeability to
criminal fines and penalties that are "not compensation for actual pe-
cuniary loss."' In so doing, Kelly quoted United States v. Heirs of
Boisdor&: "In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single
sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the
whole law, and to its object and policy."13 Kelly proceeded to resolve the
question against discharge relying on pre-Code law concerning dis-
charge of criminal restitution orders. The Kelly Court, of course, also
relied on the compelling state interest and federalism concerns in con-
tinuing post-bankruptcy enforcement of obligations imposed by state
criminal law.
The leading contemporary proponent of the competing textual-
ist method is widely perceived to be Justice Antonin Scalia, notwith-
standing his decision to join the majority in Kelly with no reservation
as to its interpretive method. In subsequent bankruptcy cases this
uncharacteristic acquiescence by Scalia in the face of pragmatic statu-
tory construction disappears. In Scalia's judicial writings, the argu-
ment for textualism, and the scorn he heaps on pragmatic interpretive
11. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986). See Tabb & Lawless, supra note 3, at 828-33.
Other Supreme Court cases that famously avoid textual interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code
on the basis of policy considerations, pre-Code law, and other pragmatic interpretive sources
include: United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983) (relying on legislative history,
pre-Code practice, and reorganization policy in rejecting literal interpretation of § 541(a)); Mid-
lantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986)
(relying on pre-Code practice); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (relying on pre-Code prac-
tice and policy in refusing to apply the § 506(a) definition of allowed secured claim in § 506(d) to
allow lien strip-down in Chapter 7 cases); and, ironically in light of his extreme textualist rheto-
ric (see, e.g., infra note 14 and accompanying text), Justice Scalia's majority opinion in BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 542-44 (1994) (finding in the context of a foreclosure sale of
real estate for inadequate consideration that the statutory term "reasonably equivalent value"
was conclusively presumed to mean whatever price resulted from a regularly conducted non-
collusive foreclosure sale on the basis of 400 years of pre-Code fraudulent transfer law in the
United States and England and the "essential state interest" in assuring the security of land
titles). Scalia's evident hypocrisy in BFP has drawn sharp criticism from scholars. See, e.g.,
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term-Foreword: Law as
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 83-84 (1994); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and
the Idea of Progress, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1546, 1550-51 (1996); Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the
Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 84 MINN. L. REV. 199, 208-12 (1999). From the
perspective of bankruptcy policy, however, the result in BFP seems perfectly sensible. Compare
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992) (following the Supreme Courts tradi-
tional nontextual sovereign immunity jurisprudence to a less fortunate conclusion from the per-
spective of sound bankruptcy policy), with Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance,
492 U.S. 96, 101-04 (1989) (same).
12. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 54-55; see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1994).
13. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 43 (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdor6, 49 U.S. [8 How.] 113,
122 (1850)).
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methods, became increasingly strident and hectoring in the 1990s as it
became clear that his colleagues on the Supreme Court, with the ex-
ception of Clarence Thomas, do not consistently apply, try to apply, or
otherwise share his commitment to, textualism."
Scalia's fullest explication of textualism is set out in the 1996
Tanner Lectures, subsequently published under the title A Matter of
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law. 5 Even in this essay,
Scalia does not comprehensively set out the textualist method in a
positive way, but rather discusses it intertwined with his critique,
which tends toward caricature, of competing interpretive traditions.
Two principles nevertheless emerge. First, textualism considers text
and statutory context in ascribing meaning to statutes, but not evi-
dence of the intent or the expectations of the legislators, or policy con-
siderations. 6 Second, the meaning of statutes is fixed and unchanging
from the time of their promulgation. 7
Stare decisis, the legal doctrine that settled issues of law
should not generally be reopened, is one explicit limit on Scalia's rig-
orous textualism. Scalia acknowledges that the Supreme Court has
not always adopted textualist interpretations, and he concedes that
simply abandoning all nontextualist precedent is impossible, and
14. See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 766 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring):
When the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" is considered in isolation, the phe-
nomenon that three Courts of Appeals could have thought it a synonym for "state law" is
mystifying. When the phrase is considered together with the rest of the Bankruptcy Code
(in which Congress chose to refer to state law as, logically enough, "state law"), the phe-
nomenon calls into question whether our legal culture has so far departed from attention
to text, or is so lacking in agreed-upon methodology for creating and interpreting text,
that it any longer makes sense to talk of "a government of laws, not of men."
Accord Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 163 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring):
It is regrettable that we have a legal culture in which such [legislative history and policy]
arguments have to be addressed (and are indeed credited by a Court of Appeals), with re-
spect to a statute utterly devoid of language that could remotely be thought to distinguish
between long-term and short-term debt. Since there was here no contention of a "scriv-
ener's error" producing an absurd result, the plain text of the statute should have made
this litigation unnecessary and unmaintainable.
See also Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 420-36 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). On Clarence
Thomas, see Lawless, supra note 3, at 109; see also Bank of America N.T. & S. v. 203 N. La.
Salle Street Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411, 1424-26 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring).
15. SCALIA, supra note 7.
16. See id. at 16-23, 29-37. One might separate out textualism that limits inquiry into leg-
islative history from textualism that refuses to take into account policy or prudential considera-
tions. One might further disaggregate textualists into those who will consider committee re-
ports, but not floor statements or hearings, or those who are willing to look to pre-Code law, but
not other prudential or policy sources. Scalia refuses to draw any of these distinctions. All leg-
islative history and all prudential considerations are trafe. For purposes of this study, I will
characterize textualism in Scalia's terms. This is generally consistent with how textualism is
understood to be applied in the bankruptcy field. See Lawless, supra note 3, at 5-6; infra note 26
and accompanying text.
17. See SCALIA, supra note 7, at 21-23, 40.
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would be irresponsibly destabilizing if it were possible." In addition,
Scalia would not apply the text as written if doing so, in his judgment,
would lead to an absurd result or if he were convinced that a scriv-
ener's error had occurred. Scalia considers these latter exceptions nar-
row. Poor draftsmanship is not "scrivener's error," and unfortunate,
unfair, or unreasonable results are not "absurd."'9
Scalia is especially, obsessively scornful of legislative history as
an interpretive aid. He acknowledges that legislative history was
looked to early in the twentieth century as a means of reining in judi-
cial interpretations of statutes that failed to honor congressional in-
tent." But he claims that legislative history is inherently so manipu-
lable and manipulated by judges and actors in the legislative process
that it fails to serve this purpose. Instead, the ability to use legislative
history to lend meaning to statutory text frees judges to deviate from
the text in order to impose their own unenacted preferences, and al-
lows legislators, their staffs, and special interests to legislate without
the inconvenience of obtaining majority votes in both houses or run-
ning the risk of a Presidential veto.2 Scalia sees no practical cost to his
blanket refusal to rely on legislative history because, again in his
view, legislative history used honestly is of no practical value in lend-
ing meaning to text.'
It is, of course, interesting that a sitting Supreme Court Justice
holds these views, and, indeed that he appears to have become in-
creasingly committed to them over the course of his tenure. Moreover,
although textualism (at least in the bankruptcy caselaw) appears to be
a method only of convenience for the Court majority and abandoned at
will," Scalia has managed to broadly influence his brethren's opinions,
though perhaps not their decisions, as his colleagues have come to feel
obliged to respond to his separate writing questioning their interpre-
tive methods.
18. See id. at 139-40.
19. Id. at 20-23.
20. See id. at 30-31.
21. See id. at 25, 29-37.
22. See id. at 36. But see Breyer, supra note 4, at 874 ("[i]n light of the judiciary's impor-
tant objective of helping to maintain coherent, workable statutory law, the case for abandoning
the use of legislative history has not yet been made. Present practice has proved useful; the
alternatives are not promising; radical change is too problematic.").
23. See Lawless, note 3, supra, at 106-13. Compare text accompanying supra notes 10-13,
and cases cited supra note 11, with text accompanying infra notes 25-38, and cases cited infra at
note 27. See also Kenneth N. Klee & Frank A. Merola, Ignoring Congressional Intent: Eight
Years of Judicial Legislation, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (1988) (describing the Supreme Court
bankruptcy jurisprudence as "[a]dopt a 'plain meaning' posture where the language of the stat-
ute meets with judicial approval, and use legislative intent to contradict the language of the
statute where a literal reading is not kind to the desired result").
2000]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
From academics, Scalia has drawn much, sometimes scathing,
criticism for his textualist views.' Pragmatists, and policy-oriented
law professors especially, are easily put off by the attitude towards
adjudication adopted by textualists. At least when courts create bad
law relying upon presumed legislative intentions or policies, one gen-
erally has the sense that the court cared enough to try and "get it
right." Textualists take no apparent responsibility for trying to "get it
right." "Getting it right" is the legislature's job. Textualist courts apply
statutes as written.
Scalia's textualism is not simply philistine literalism,' but
Scalia's rhetoric defending textualism does invite its caricature as
such, as indeed do some textualist decisions he has joined. In any
event, the Supreme Court has seriously advocated, and more than oc-
casionally imposed, a rigorous textualism that approximates literal-
ism in bankruptcy cases. 6 Consider Justice Blackmun's notorious (to
bankruptcy lawyers) opinion in the "comma case," United States v.
Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc."1
Bankruptcy Code § 506(b)28 provides a limited exception to the
ordinary bankruptcy rule that interest on creditor claims stops ac-
cruing after bankruptcy.' The exception codifies the understanding
24. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 230-34
(1994); SCALIA, supra note 7, at 3-47 (criticism of Gordon S. Wood, Laurence H. Tribe, Ronald
Dworkin, and Mary Ann Glendon); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L.
REv. 621, 666-91 (1990); Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning' Justice Scalia's Jurispru-
dence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 475-77 (1994). But see
Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really "Legislative Bargains'? The Failure of the Contract
Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1145, 1189 (1998); Adrian Vermeule, Legis-
lative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1836-37 (1998).
25. See SCALIA, supra note 7, at 23-25 (discussing textualist as opposed to literal interpreta-
tion).
26. See Lawless, supra note 3, at 7-100 (reviewing cases); see also Peter H. Carroll, III, Lit-
eralism: The United States Supreme Court's Methodology for Statutory Construction in Bank-
ruptcy Cases, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 143, 147-49 (1993).
27. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989). Other prominent textual
interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code by the Supreme Court include: Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S.
464 (1993); Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993); and Toibb v. Radloff, 501
U.S. 157 (1991). United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365
(1988), Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991), and Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753
(1992), are three prominent decisions that are generally thought of as textual interpretations.
These latter cases do indeed rely heavily on textualist arguments to override policy-based argu-
ments favoring alternative interpretations, but they also rely secondarily on other nontextualist
sources. See Lawless, supra note 3, at 13-19 (discussing Wolas), 50-53 (discussing Patterson);
Tabb & Lawless, supra note 3, at 837 (discussing Timbers).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994).
29. Id. § 502(b)(2).
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under the Bankruptcy Act of 189830 that a secured creditor could ac-
crue interest on his claim after bankruptcy to the extent that the
value of his collateral exceeded the principal amount of his claim.
The collateral, in accordance with the terms of the secured creditor's
contract, secures both principal and interest. The exception was
thought to preserve the basic bargain of the secured creditor. For
those who had no collateral or whose collateral was exhausted, no in-
terest. Before 1979, only consensual secured creditors, those who had
bargained for the right to collect interest from their collateral, bene-
fited from this exception.32 Nonconsensual secured creditors-those
(for example tax collectors) whose lien arose by operation of law,
rather than by contract-like general unsecured creditors, accrued no
interest, even when the value of the property subject to their lien ex-
ceeded the principal amount of their claims.
Section 506(b) clearly preserved the historical exception to the
no-post-bankruptcy-interest rule in favor of the consensual secured
creditor. The question in Ron Pair was whether it also expanded the
exception to include nonconsensual creditors.3 This question was of
considerable practical importance to the government; the most impor-
tant nonconsensual secured creditor in bankruptcies generally is the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), whose pervasive tax lien against
virtually all property of the taxpayer arises by operation of law when
assessed taxes go unpaid. Could the IRS collect interest on tax claims
secured by tax liens under § 506(b), or were they subject to the ordi-
nary no-interest rule?
Section 506(b) reads:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of which,
after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the amount of
such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim,
30. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 559-62 (1898) (repealed as subsequently
amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 506, 92 Stat. 2549, 2583 effec-
tive Oct. 1, 1979).
31. The general no-interest rule is itself a codification of pre-Code law, see Sexton v. Drey-
fus, 219 U.S. 339, 344 (1911), as is the codified exception in favor of consensual secured creditors
with excess collateral, see Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 164-65
(1946).
32. See United States v. Yorke (In re Kerber Packing Co.), 276 F.2d 245, 247-48 (7th Cir.
1960); United States v. Mighell, 273 F.2d 682, 684 (10th Cir. 1959); United States v. Bass, 271
F.2d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Harrington, 269 F.2d 719, 722-24 (4th Cir. 1959)
(holding that even if there were a general exception for oversecured claims, it would not apply to
tax liens); see also In re Boston & Maine Corp., 719 F.2d 493, 496-97 (1st Cir. 1983) (municipal
property tax claim), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 938 (1984). But see In re Parchem, 166 F. Supp. 724,
730 (D. Minn. 1958) (allowing postpetition interest on tax claim), appeal dismissed upon stipula-
tion, 261 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1958); accord Ross Nursing Home v. Tuthill (In re Ross Nursing
Home), 2 B.R. 496, 499-500 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
33. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 237 (1989).
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and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement under
which such claim arose.
34
The Supreme Court in Ron Pair, in a 5-4 decision, found that the fifth
of the seven commas in the sentence quoted above allowed the IRS to
collect interest.35 The Court first announced its method of interpreta-
tion:
The task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of § 506(b) begins where all such
inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself. In this case it is also
where the inquiry should end, for where, as here, the statute's language is plain, "the
sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." The language before
us expresses Congress' intent-that postpetition interest be available-with sufficient
precision so that reference to legislative history and to pre-Code practice is hardly nec-
essary.
36
The Court then examined the "plain language' of the statute:
The relevant phrase in § 506(b) is: "[Tihere shall be allowed to the holder of such claim,
interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under
the agreement under which such claim arose." "Such claim" refers to an oversecured
claim. The natural reading of the phrase entitles the holder of an oversecured claim to
postpetition interest and, in addition, gives one having a secured claim created pursu-
ant to an agreement the right to reasonable fees, costs, and charges provided for in that
agreement. Recovery of postpetition interest is unqualified. Recovery of fees, costs, and
charges, however, is allowed only if they are reasonable and provided for in the agree-
ment under which the claim arose. Therefore, in the absence of an agreement, postpeti-
tion interest is the only added recovery available.3 7
Finally, the Court focused on the fifth of the seven commas in the text:
This reading is also mandated by the grammatical structure of the statute. The phrase
"interest on such claim" is set aside by commas, and separated from the reference to
fees, costs, and charges by the conjunctive words "and any." As a result, the phrase "in-
terest on such claim" stands independent of the language that follows. "[lInterest on
such claim" is not part of the list made up of "fees, costs, or charges," nor is it joined to
the following clause so that the final "provided for under the agreement" modifies it as
well. The language and punctuation Congress used cannot be read in any other way.
By the plain language of the statute, the two types of recovery are distinct.38
How disheartening to find five Supreme Court Justices sub-
scribing to such nonsense! For one thing, if § 506(b) "cannot be read in
any other way," why did the question split the circuits and indeed the
Supreme Court itself? For another, § 506(b) on its face explicitly dis-
tinguishes between nonconsensual and consensual secured claims by
referring to an "agreement under which the claim arose." This at a
minimum should cause a reasonable judge--or any lawyer-to reflect
34. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).
35. Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241.
36. Id. (citations omitted).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 241-42 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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on how this distinction arose, why it exists, and whether the reasons
for that distinction might apply to this case. Finally, that the Congress
should or could contemplate or achieve a decisive change in law on
this point by nothing more than placing a comma before the conjunc-
tion "and," or that it could or should realize that this sentence with or
without that comma would be susceptible only to the meaning as-
cribed by the Supreme Court majority, is, to say the least, an entirely
unrealistic view of the precision of (in ascending levels of generality)
congressional drafting, the English language, and the nature of hu-
man communication.
Ron Pair shows textualism in a silly light. But a particular ab-
surd application of the textualist method does not demonstrate that
textualism is in general absurd. In an unguarded moment, even Scalia
might agree that perhaps Ron Pair goes a bit far: the comma might
not necessarily be dispositive and the text might in fact be ambiguous.
But leaving to one side Ron Pair's dubious minor premise that § 506(b)
was not ambiguous, textualists necessarily embrace Ron Pair's major
interpretive premise. Finding no ambiguity in the text, the textualist
goes no further. Ron Pair is bottomed on a judicial abdication of re-
sponsibility. The Supreme Court majority is saying: If the text alone
seems to us to give the IRS interest on its tax claim based on the
punctuation, in settling the law on this point, we will not weigh any
considerations based on history, bankruptcy policy and administra-
tion, or extrinsic evidence of what Congress really intended.
This agnostic stance with respect to the practical consequences,
purpose, and efficacy of a particular construction is an essential char-
acteristic of textualism. Textualists do not deny their agnosticism.3
Rather, they defend it on three grounds. First, they presume a lack of
judicial competence to assess nontextualist sources. On this view, tex-
tualism despite its flaws yields better results than pragmatism. Sec-
ond, they celebrate the "passive virtue" of judicial restraint. Textual-
ism circumscribes the discretion of a nonmajoritarian judiciary and
thereby protects the prerogatives of the political branches, lends
greater stability to the law by making it easier for private persons to
conform their conduct and order their affairs in accordance with the
39. See SCALIA, supra note 7, at 22:
It may well be that the statutory interpretation adopted by the Court in Church of the
Holy Trinity produced a desirable result; and it may even be (though I doubt it) that it
produced the unexpressed result actually intended by Congress, rather than merely the
one desired by the Court. Regardless, the decision was wrong because it failed to follow
the text.
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law, and, perhaps, enhances the independence of the judiciary."0
Thirdly, some textualists suggest textualism as the cure for what ails
the legislative process. Congress assertedly would draft better statutes
if courts consistently used textualist methods. This third defense is a
makeweight; there is no evidence that Congress in fact responds to
textualist interpretation by improving the technical quality of its work
product, and indeed history suggests quite the opposite to be true."
The first, essentially utilitarian, defense of textualism is coun-
terintuitive. On its face, pragmatism seems more consistent with a
utilitarian philosophy than textualism. If one accepts, as a utilitarian
presumably does, that the goal of statutory interpretation is rational
development of complex statutory schemes in a manner consistent
with democratically-selected policy goals, then all things being other-
wise equal, pragmatic judges, adopting appropriately deferential atti-
tudes towards political choices, when informed by actual circum-
stances in real cases, should do better in achieving this goal than
judges who defer to ex ante legislative drafting choices made without
consciousness of the real consequences in the present unimagined or
foggily anticipated case.
In short, the textualist is hampered in many ways in getting to
a sensible answer. He is constrained to defer to a text that was drafted
without awareness of the particular facts and circumstances of the
case before the court; in an often hectic process involving compromise
40. This Article engages in a utilitarian evaluation of textualism, and so the second, essen-
tially legitimacy-based defense is not the focus here. Citing substantial empirical, historical, and
anecdotal evidence, many commentators question whether textualism meaningfully circum-
scribes judicial discretion. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 7, at 62-63 (comments of Gordon S.
Wood); Nehf, supra note 3, at 9 (study of judicial interpretations of state consumer protection
laws indicates that "[flar from being outcome determinative, textualism proved to be an ex-
tremely flexible method of justifying virtually any decision the court desired'); Tabb & Lawless,
supra note 3, at 880-81 (opining that the Rehnquist Courts "textualist drift" leads to interpretive
uncertainty). This evidence and argument naturally undermines textualist assertions that tex-
tualism lends greater stability to the law. Many of the same pragmatic commentators, as well as
some textualist sympathizers, are especially dubious that textualism (or any other statutory
construction method) potentially protects judicial independence. See SCALIA, supra note 7, at
113-14 (comments of Mary Ann Glendon). Protecting judicial independence seems inapplicable
in the context of construction of the Bankruptcy Code. I find it mildly amusing to consider that
the integrity of our independent federal judiciary could be remotely compromised by any con-
struction of any section of the United States Bankruptcy Code, whether textualist or pragmatic,
however implausible, and however poorly it serves bankruptcy policy or honors legislative intent.
It is important for those millions of Americans involved as debtors and creditors in the bank-
ruptcy system that we get bankruptcy law right. But the vitality of our independent judiciary is
not plausibly at stake. But see id. at 46-47 (essay and response of Antonin Scalia) (discussing
implications for judicial independence of nontextualist constitutional interpretation).
41. Compare supra note 20 and accompanying text, with infra note 46. See Eskridge, Tex-
tualism, supra note 3, at 1550-51 ("[Ihe new textualism unfairly saddles Congress with obliga-
tions it cannot always fulfill.").
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and political posturing; and by persons frequently with little experi-
ence in litigation and legal interpretation or relevant expertise in the
particular field of law.
Compare the pragmatic jurist who in adjudicating is informed
by evidence and argument of the particular facts and circumstances of
the case; engaged in a rationalistic, reflective and generally apolitical
process; and expert in law and legal method.
The textualists' utilitarian argument rests on a bleak view of
judicial competence and a remarkably optimistic estimate of the ca-
pacities of politicians. Judges in the textualist world are so much
worse at working out the details of bankruptcy policy than legislators
that they somehow manage to squander the powerful natural advan-
tages of hindsight, deliberation, and direct experience in administer-
ing statutes. Textualists respond by noting that if textualism produces
errors, those errors can be readily overcome by new legislation. They
also suggest that pragmatists err too, or willfully abuse the pragmatic
method to impose policy choices that would not be democratically se-
lected."
Sunstein's hypothesis that "it is disagreement over the under-
lying empirical issues-not over large concepts of any kind-that prin-
cipally separates [textualists] and [pragmatists]" and that "with
imaginable empirical findings, both [textualists] and [pragmatists]
should be flexible enough to move in the direction of their apparent
adversaries,"43 frankly seems pollyannaish. It is extremely unlikely
that Justice Scalia will bow to any imaginable empirical evidence on
these points. Many textualists appear more deeply committed to their
interpretive method than to a vision of law as a living, breathing thing
purposively structured to serve the society it regulates. Textualism's
formalism is more likely to appeal to those naturally disposed to em-
brace ideologies other than utility maximizing. Nevertheless, to a
pragmatist, the evidence on these points is necessarily relevant to his
choice of interpretive method. And at least some academic textualists
assert not only that textualism works better,4 but also that they are
open to evidence to the contrary.45
42. See SCALIA, supra note 7, at 17-18. But see West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey,
499 U.S. 83, 113-16 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 3, at 348
(noting that Congress "rarely" overturns explicitly policy-based statutory decisions).
43. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 642-43, 662-66.
44. See SCALIA, supra note 7, at 17-18; Movsesian, supra note 24, at 1187; Vermeule, supra
note 24, at 1896. Cf Eskridge, supra note 2, at 672 & n.5 ('Like Scalia, most of the other leading
statutory formalists have provided functional as well as formal reasons in favor of their theo-
ries.").
45. See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 24, at 1865.
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II. THE STUDY OF OVERRULED BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS
In accepting Sunstein's invitation to test textualism empiri-
cally, I choose bankruptcy law as the testing ground because I know
bankruptcy, I like it, and I can't imagine ferreting out and analyzing
dozens of overruled, say, tax cases to assess textualism in interpreting
the Internal Revenue Code. Notwithstanding these personal idiosyn-
crasies, it turns out that the Bankruptcy Code is one of the best test-
ing grounds in the federal system for the textualist method.
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code is a rather well-worked out, techni-
cally drafted, modern and comprehensive statute that is the product of
a lengthy and especially thoughtful legislative process and benefits
from approximately 100 years of extensive prior federal experience in
the field.46 As such, it minimizes some of the disadvantages that the
textualist naturally labors under, and presents the most favorable en-
vironment possible for textualist interpretation. Textualism should
work better here than almost anywhere else. 7
Moreover, as previously indicated, the Supreme Court has cho-
sen to make the bankruptcy statute a kind of proving ground for tex-
tualist interpretation, regularly adopting textualist interpretations to
settle the law on contested questions arising under the Bankruptcy
Code. 8 Determining error in the exegesis of a complex statutory
46. See WILLIAM MILLER COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY APP. B, PT. 4(b), at 4-199 to
-218 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996) (describing in detail the ten years and hundreds of
participants' efforts culminating in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978). In contrast, the many
amendments to the Code since 1978 can often be fairly characterized as patchwork, ill thought-
through, or special interest legislation insensitive to the overall structure of the Code and bank-
ruptcy policy. See Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, On the UCC Revision Process: A Reply to Dean
Scott, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1217, 1238-44 (1996).
47. See SCALIA, supra note 7, at 143 (Antonin Scalia response to Mary Ann Glendon) ("[Pro-
fessor Glendon] makes the point that it is difficult to maintain and apply a coherent theory of
statutory interpretation when dealing with statutes that are themselves incoherent--the 'hastily
cobbled compromises' of modern regulatory legislation, as opposed to 'carefully drafted codes.'
That is unquestionably true.'); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 24, at 9-11 (arguing that passage of
time renders original meaning of statutes less relevant). Even committed pragmatists William
Eskridge and Philip Frickey have argued for textualism in bankruptcy cases. See ESKRIDGE &
FRICKEY, supra note 9, at 630-31. They note that "although neither of us is a textualist, as ap-
pellate judges we might well give especially strong primacy to statutory text in some cases." Id.
at 630. The authors continue: 'Illustratively, the bankruptcy code is mammoth and complex,
and neither of us is much familiar with its complicated subject matter.... In the complicated
corporate bankruptcy case ... we might pretty much stick with the statutory text." Id. at 630-
31; see also Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 3, at 373 ('The preference for plain meaning is most
important for recent and detailed statutes."). But see Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 538 (charac-
terizing the Code in similar terms but suggesting its structure and form might be thought to
facilitate sound pragmatic interpretation); accord Lawless, supra note 3, at 4.
48. See Lowell P. Bottrell, The Supreme Court and the "Plain Meaning" of the Bankruptcy
Code: A Review of Recent and Pending Supreme Court Decisions, 69 N.D. L. REV. 155, 201 (1993);
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scheme is generally a question of judgment, and depends upon an as-
sessment of consequences and an understanding of the policies of the
statute. Most interpretive "errors" are debatable.49
Nevertheless, the textualist suggestion that legislative error-
correction is the appropriate safeguard to textualist excess, suggests
one reasonable, neutral (but partial) definition of error: interpreta-
tions subsequently superseded by statute. Statutory overruling indi-
cates that the law as interpreted does not meet present political and
policy goals in a substantial enough way to overcome the very consid-
erable inertia within the legislative process. Given the subsequent
legislation, the overruled interpretation is socially costly; the benefits
of the overruled interpretation are not realized because of the later
statutory change, but all the costs of adjudication and new legislation
are paid. And there is an obvious injustice worked on the litigant who
loses, and others subject to the court decision that is destined for over-
ruling, while future similarly situated persons obtain the benefit of
the later amendment. If textualists make more errors that require
statutory overruling, and if it is apparent that statutory overruling is
costly, time consuming, and inefficient as error correction, these facts
should be relevant to judges in choosing an appropriate method of
statutory construction.'
Lawyers and law professors ordinarily ignore superseded cases
for the obvious reason that they are no longer good law. But the study
of statutory overrulings yields valuable insights into the quality and
importance of interstitial judicial law making.'
I adopted the following method for this study. I compared the
originally enacted Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 with the 1998
Bankruptcy Code. Working backward from the many changes in
statutory language over this twenty-year period, I identified the sub-
stantive amendments to each Code section. I then sought to ascertain
Carroll, supra note 26, at 154-66; Carlos J. Cuevas, The Rehnquist Court, Strict Statutory Con-
struction and the Bankruptcy Code, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 435, 439-40 (1994); Walter A. Effross,
Grammarians at the Gate: The Rehnquist Court's Evolving "Plain Meaning" Approach to Bank-
ruptcy Jurisprudence, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1636, 1754-62 (1993); Lawless, supra note 3, at 6;
Tabb & Lawless, supra note 3, at 879-81; Adam J. Wiensch, Note, The Supreme Court, Textual-
ism, and the Treatment of Pre-Bankruptcy Code Law, 79 GEO. L.J. 1831, 1839-51 (1991); see also
supra note 26 and accompanying text.
49. But see Sunstein, supra note 2, at 666-68 (defending imaginative reconstruction as a ba-
sis for determining error).
50. See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 113-16 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
51. See Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 3, at 333-35.
52. For a compilation of the amendments and an excellent brief overview of major bank-
ruptcy legislation 1979-1994, see Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in
the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 37-43 (1995).
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whether in each case the substantive amendment could be fairly said
to be a statutory overruling of a case or line of cases or settle a ques-
tion of interpretation that had divided the federal courts.' In order to
identify overrulings, I studied the legislative history of each amend-
ment, pre-amendment caselaw, post-amendment caselaw, and both
current and superseded treatises. In some cases, the fact of statutory
overruling was notorious and known to me and any other bankruptcy
specialist in advance. Such cases include NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco,' Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp.,5 and Rake v.
Wade.' In the case of the 1994 Amendments, the accompanying sec-
tion-by-section analysis57 was an invaluable aid in identifying less no-
torious overrulings. Reconstructing the reasons for other statutory
changes was often very difficult and sometimes inconclusive.
Nevertheless, by this process I identified fifty-eight instances of
statutory overruling. Whenever I identified an instance of statutory
overruling I sought to further identify the "leading case" in the over-
53. Thus I excluded the enactment of Chapter 12-a novel and distinctive blend of Chapter
11 and Chapter 13 reorganizations available only to family farmers. Chapter 12, enacted in
1986, was provoked by the fact that few small farms could successfully reorganize under Chapter
11 given depressed agricultural prices and land values in the mid-1980s. In Ahlers v. Norwest
Bank Worthington (In re Ahlers), 794 F.2d 388, 399-403 (8th Cir. 1986), the Eighth Circuit at-
tempted to ameliorate this hardship by promulgating a "sweat equity" doctrine under Chapter 11
that would have facilitated farm reorganizations-at a cost of generally rewriting the balance
drawn between debtors and creditors in Chapter 11. The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth
Circuit in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 211 (1988), after Chapter 12 had
been enacted. I do not view Chapter 12 as simply a codification of Ahlers or other cases that
tried to.deal with the farm crisis in narrow ways through interpretation nor do I see it as a repu-
diation of the cases applying general Chapter 11 law to farmers. Similarly in 1984, Congress
reworked the balance between consumers and consumer lenders in Chapter 13 based on a com-
plex compromise between these interest groups. I view the amendments to § 707(b) and § 1325
creating the substantial abuse and net disposable income tests not as directed at overruling a
particular case or line of cases, but rather as a change in legislative policy. See Karen Gross,
Preserving a Fresh Start for the Individual Debtor: The Case for Narrow Construction of the
Consumer Credit Amendments, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 76-85 (1986). I also excluded instances
where Congress seems to have adopted the basic interpretation placed upon a section by the
courts but changed a specific term to sweep more parties within (or exclude them from) the pro-
tection of the statute. For example, in 1994 Congress changed the grace period for perfection of
purchase money security interests under § 547(c)(3)(B) from ten to twenty days. Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 203, 108 Stat. 4106, 4121-22 (1994). I did not view
this change as repudiating the construction placed on the statute by courts that had held inter-
ests perfected after say eighteen days as outside the protection of the original statute. Rather,
Congress adopted that construction and simply changed the length of the statutory grace period.
Similarly, where dollar limits or other time limits have been changed, I have generally not con-
sidered the amendments as overruling cases that had enforced the original limits.
54. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
55. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
56. Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 (1993).
57. See The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994-Section-By-Section Description, 140 CONG.
REC. H10764 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994).
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ruled line. If the Supreme Court had decided the issue, then I deemed
the Supreme Court decision to be the leading authority.58 Otherwise
the first fully reasoned published Court of Appeals decision on the
point was identified as the "leading case." If no published Court of Ap-
peals decision was available, I identified the most prominent pub-
lished decision on the point using whatever indications existed in the
legislative history, cases, or treatises, generally giving priority to deci-
sions of district courts or bankruptcy appellate panels over bankruptcy
courts, and earlier decisions over later ones.59
The list of overruled leading cases is found at Appendix I. Ap-
pendix I is intended to be an exhaustive listing of the instances of
58. The omission of Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991), from Appendix I is one pseudo-
exception to this practice. Owen disapproved McManus v. AVCO Financial Services of La. (In re
McManus), 681 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1982). McManus held that a debtor electing to exempt tools of
the trade pursuant to the unlimited Louisiana state law exemption statute could not then attack
non-possessory non-purchase money liens under § 522(f) that were valid under Louisiana law.
See McManus, 681 F.2d at 357. McManus took the view that the debtor "took the bitter with the
sweet": Debtors could not mix and match generous federal avoiding powers with generous state
law exemptions. Owen allowed exactly this mix and match technique with regard to the avoid-
ance of judicial liens against real property exempted under Florida homestead law. Owen, 500
U.S. at 313. Congress reacted by amending the Code to distinguish non-possessory non-purchase
money liens from judicial liens for § 522(f) purposes and limiting the extent of the avoiding power
with respect to the consensual liens. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 310,
108 Stat. 4106, 4137 (1994). Some courts and commentators understandably view this amend-
ment as a repudiation of the Owen reasoning, see, e.g., In re Parrish, 186 B.R. 246 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1995), but the Owen result stands. But see Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 301 (1991).
Accordingly, I did not code Owen. I did code Central National Bank & Trust Co. v. Liming (In re
Liming) 797 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1986), which anticipated the Owen reasoning in the context of
consensual, rather than judicial, liens, and whose result and reasoning were both overruled by
the amendment creating the distinction between judicial and consensual liens for § 522(f) avoid-
ance purposes and limiting the avoidability of consensual liens.
59. Stuart v. Pingree (In re AFCO Development Corp.), 65 B.R. 781, 787 (Bankr. D. Utah
1986), is the seminal decision in the line of bankruptcy court decisions that granted each succes-
sive bankruptcy trustee a fresh statute of limitations to bring avoiding power actions. AFCO
appears in Appendix I even though the federal district court for Utah rejected its holding shortly
before it was superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 216, 108
Stat. 4106, 4126. See Gillman v. Mark Oakes Trucking (In re CVA Assocs.), 171 B.R. 122, 127
(D. Utah 1994). It is unclear whether district court decisions in bankruptcy appeals bind bank-
ruptcy courts in subsequent cases within the district. See Daniel J. Bussel, Power, Authority,
and Precedent in Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1071-72, 1094-98
(1994). Regardless of whether AFCO was formally overruled by CVA, AFCO is fairly character-
ized as the leading case in a line of cases that retained significant vitality until the statute was
amended. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 112 B.R. 78 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), is excluded from
Appendix I. The leading authority for its primary holding on the scope of § 1110 is Swiss Air
Transport Co. v. Texas International Airlines, Inc. (In re Continental Airlines Corp.), 57 B.R. 854
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985), a case that is included in this study. Ionosphere's secondary holding,
that certain beneficial holders of security interests governed by § 1110 lacked standing, had not
been followed by any other court and was reversed on appeal, 123 B.R. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1991),
before being superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106.
I did not think it appropriate to characterize Ionosphere as a leading case under these circum-
stances.
904 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 53:887
statutory overrulings under Title 11, United States Code, 1979-1998.'
Amendments to the bankruptcy rules, jurisdictional provisions, and
criminal statutes related to bankruptcy, or other statutes that may
impinge upon bankruptcy, for example the Internal Revenue Code,
have not been researched. In two cases, research established that sub-
stantive amendments were enacted in direct reaction to unpublished
bankruptcy court dispositions.6 These unpublished cases were ex-
cluded from the study to avoid inferring interpretive methodology
from insufficient information and because I had little reason to think I
had uncovered all the unpublished decisions that might be viewed as
60. Appendix I, while limited to overruled bankruptcy cases decided after 1979, is, within
that domain, substantially more comprehensive than the cases identified and analyzed by Pro-
fessor Eskridge in his 1991 study of "overridden" decisions. Eskridge relied on references to
overrulings in committee reports reprinted in United States Code Congressional and Administra-
tive News (USCCAN). Id. at 336-37 & n.11. See Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 3, at 336-37.
But as Eskridge himself acknowledged many amendments are not accompanied by detailed
committee reports and many reports do not specifically refer to decisions to be superseded and
still others are not reprinted in USCCAN. Although the Eskridge study noted overruled bank-
ruptcy decisions in the period 1967-1990, twenty-two of these were overruled by the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, which of course happened to be accompanied by extensive committee reports.
See id. at 435-36. Three of the seven additional bankruptcy cases included in Eskridge's
study-NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990), and Lubrizol Enterprises v. Richmond Metal Finish-
ers, 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985)-form part of this study as well. Eskridge identifies General
Accident Insurance Co. v. Cain (In re Cain), 96 B.R. 115 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988), as overriden by
the Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3102, 104 Stat. 4789, 4916 (codified at 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (1994)). See Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 3, at 424. This study identifies
a prior decision from the same court, City of Akron v. Jackson (In re Jackson), 77 B.R. 120
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987), as the leading pre-amendment authority on the question. Meyer v.
Commissioner, 383 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1967) and Lane v. Haytien Corp., 117 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.
1941), are in the Eskridge study but, like the cases overruled by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, fall outside the time period for this work.
Finally, Eskridge identifies In re Bastian, 45 B.R. 717 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985), which permit-
ted termination of an ERISA regulated pension plan in bankruptcy, as a bankruptcy case. See
Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 3, at 429. Bastian involved a conflict between ERISA and the
Bankruptcy Code that was ultimately resolved by an amendment to ERISA. It therefore does
not appear in Appendix I. The Eskridge study, on the other hand, excludes eighteen cases su-
perseded in the period 1979-1990 that I identify in Appendix I. Twelve of these are bankruptcy
court decisions, the rest are Court of Appeals cases not mentioned in USCCAN but which I nev-
ertheless was able to identify as having been intentionally superseded by statute. Even though
Eskridge sought to identify all federal decisions overruled between 1967-1990, he analyzed only
those Supreme Court decisions overruled within ten years-some eighty-nine cases. See id. at
450-55. Only four bankruptcy decisions made the final cut in the Eskridge study. See id. at 450-
55.
61. See Lombard-Wall, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co. (In re Lombard-Wall Inc.), 23 B.R. 165,
165-66 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) superseded by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 396, 98 Stat. 333, 366 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 559 (1994)) (dis-
cussed in S. REP. No. 98-65, at 47 (1983) and in 130 CONG. REC. 20,229 (1984) (remarks of Mr.
Glickman)); In re Los Altos Hotel Assocs., No. 5-81-01943, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 2332 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. Dec. 29, 1981), superseded by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
Pub.L. No. 98-353, § 512, 98 Stat. 333, 386-87 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (1994)).
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having been superseded by statute. Excluded also are three decisions
where the inference that the amendment was provoked by the case
decision seemed tenuous and whose interpretive method was in any
event difficult to classify." Finally, I excluded three instances of what
I deemed to be inadvertent overruling--cases where courts subse-
quently found that an unintended effect of an amendment was to
overrule prior caselaw.'
62. In Shell Oil Co. v. Anne Cara Oil Co. (In re Anne Cara Oil Co.), 32 B.R. 643, 648 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1983), the court stated in brief dicta that incurable nonmonetary defaults might have
precluded assumption of a franchise agreement under § 365. Eleven years later § 365(b)(2)(D)
was amended, apparently to excuse cure of incurable nonmonetary defaults. See Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 219(a), 108 Stat. 4106, 4128. Ironically, the Ninth
Circuit recently held that the amendment actually had the effect of codifying the Anne Cara Oil
dicta. See In re Claremont Acquisition Corp., 113 F.3d 1029, 1034 (9th Cir. 1997). In re Texas
Extrusion Corp., 68 B.R. 712, 715 (N.D. Tex. 1986), affd on other grounds, 836 F.2d 217 (5th
Cir.), laterproceeding 844 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988), involved a sub-
sequent Chapter 11 filing by the wife of the owner of the corporate debtor. The wife had no sepa-
rate property, only some $2000 in separate debt, and her filing was evidently a strategic ploy to
simply delay the proceedings in the corporate case. See id. at 727. The bankruptcy court allowed
the plan proponent in the corporate case to proceed to confirmation promptly, notwithstanding
the wife's filing, by administratively consolidating the wife's case with the corporate one, termi-
nating her 120-day exclusive period to propose a plan, and retroactively deeming the disclosure
statement already approved in the corporate case applicable to her individual case. See id.
Subsequent to the bankruptcy court's action (but before the district court's affirmance) § 1121(d)
was amended to provide that extensions or reductions in exclusivity had to be on the basis of
requests made within the exclusivity period itself. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 506(b), 98 Stat. 333, 385 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1121(d) (1994)). This change precludes retroactive changes in the exclusive period. It is not
clear, however, that the amended statute would require a different result in the unusual fact
situation presented in Texas Extrusion. Finally, in Solon Automated Services, Inc. v. Georgetown
of Kettering, Ltd. (In re Georgetown of Kettering, Ltd.), 22 B.R. 312, 317 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982),
the bankruptcy court indicated in dicta that a confirmation order might be revoked for reasons
other than fraud notwithstanding § 1144, which stated that such orders may be revoked "if pro-
cured by fraud." Section 1144 was thereafter amended to provide for revocation "if and only if"
such order is procured by fraud. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 515, 98 Stat. 333, 387. Continuing confusion on the grounds for revo-
cation of confirmation orders exists given FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) and the absence of conforming
amendments to Chapters 12 and 13 in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984. See Branchburg Plaza Assocs. v. Fesq (In re Fesq), 153 F.3d 113, 115-17 (3d Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1253 (1999).
63. See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991) (holding that the deletion of the 45-day
limitation on the ordinary course of business defense to preference avoidance, 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(c)(2), brought all long-term debt within the defense as well as the short-term commercial
paper and trade credit clearly intended by its sponsors); S. REP. No. 98-65, at 60 (1983); Hear-
ings on S. 3023, Before the Subcomm. on Judicial Machinery of the Senate, Comm. on Judiciary,
96th Cong. 8-27 (1980) (statements of Mr. Van Cleave of Goldman Sachs & Co. and Mr. Ledinsky
of A.G. Becker & Co.); Hearings on Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Subcomm. on Courts, S.
Comm. on Judiciary 97th Cong. 259-60 (1981) (statement of Mr. Gestautas of National Associa-
tion of Credit Management). The Supreme Court expressly assumed that the bankruptcy trustee
was correct in asserting that the amendment was intended to "redress particular problems of
specific short term creditors." Union Bank, 502 U.S. at 157-58. It went on to state that "Itihe
fact that Congress may not have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not
906 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 53:887
Although there may well be a few instances where further re-
search may have uncovered a line of cases superseded by some over-
looked or excluded amendment or where one might quibble about my
classification of a particular amendment as a' policy change rather
than an overruling, or which case is appropriately described as the
leading authority for a particular view, I feel confident that Appendix
I effectively captures the relevant universe. As we identified cases in
the relevant universe, I or a research assistant, filled out a Data Col-
lection Form for each overruled case that (i) recorded certain basic
information about the overruled case, and (ii) assessed on a 1-7 scale
the degree to which the mode of interpretation adopted by the court
was textualist or pragmatic or determined by precedent or not ascer-
tainable.' Then I, based on my knowledge of post-amendment
sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to its plain meaning." Id. at 158. In re Atlanta-
Stewart Partners, 193 B.R. 79, 82 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996), asserted that the deletion of § 1124(3)
(which was done expressly to overrule In re New Valley Corp., 168 B.R. 73 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1993),
see Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994-Section-By-Section Description § 214, 140 CONG. REC.
H10768 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994)), had the unintended consequence of also overruling the artificial
impairment line of cases. See Windsor on the River Assocs. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re
Windsor on the River Assocs.), 7 F.3d 127, 130-32 (8th Cir. 1993). (Professor Kenneth Klee,
supra note *, however, who lobbied for the 1994 repeal of § 1124(3) in lieu of amendments to
§ 1129 directed at overruling New Valley, recalls that the implications of § 1124(3)'s repeal for
the artificial impairment cases were understood and accepted by legislative staff and lobbyists on
all sides at the time.) Finally, also in 1994, Congress made a conforming amendment to
§ 1123(d) in the course of ensuring that Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 475 (1993), a Chapter 13
case allowing secured parties unbargained for interest-on-interest in the home mortgage context,
was overruled under all possibly applicable chapters of the Code. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994-Section-By-Section Description § 305, 140 CONG. REc. H10770 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994). The
literal language of the amendment draws into question the line of cases disallowing bargained-
for penalty interest. See Great W. Bank & Trust v. Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc. (In re
Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc.), 850 F.2d 1338, 1340-42 (9th Cir. 1988). These instances of
inadvertent overruling underscore the point made later that statutory overruling is a risky and
uncertain business. See infra text accompanying notes 78-106. But they are properly excluded
from this study. The goal here is to determine the characteristics of those cases that sufficiently
disserve Congressional bankruptcy policy that they are deliberately superseded by statute.
64. The data collection form and written coding protocol is attached as Appendix II. The
relevant categories of interpretive method on the 1-7 scale are described as follows:
1. Textualist: Code for decisions that make the language of the statute dispositive not-
withstanding competing interpretations (if any) based upon legislative history, past
practice under the Bankruptcy Act, or policy.
2. Primarily but not exclusively textual: Code for decisions that give decisive weight to
the language of the statute, but cite as supportive interpretive sources relevant legisla-
tive history, past practice, or policy.
3. Relies on both textual and nontextual sources: Code for decisions that rely on both
statutory language and relevant legislative history, past practice, or policy as mutually
supporting rationales for the decision.
4. Primarily but not exclusively [pragmatic]. Code for decisions that give decisive weight
to relevant legislative history, past practice, or policy, but cite the language of the stat-
ute as supportive of the decision.
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caselaw, subsequent further amendments, and general knowledge of
bankruptcy law, subjectively assessed the efficacy of the subsequent
amendment in overruling the decision.
It is no easy matter to specify the appropriate control group
with which to compare the set of overruled cases. In a true experi-
ment, the investigator would draw a random sample of pending bank-
ruptcy cases raising statutory interpretation issues, randomly assign
interpretive methods to them-some textualist, some pragmatic-and
then record Congress' reaction.65 Fortunately, investigators are not
permitted by the Constitution and laws of the United States to con-
duct such experiments. Nevertheless, considering such an experiment
clarifies that the task in selecting a control group is to try to capture a
representative (i.e., unbiased) sample of all cases raising questions of
statutory interpretation, against which the overruled cases can be
compared.
Most reported cases do not purport to settle substantive issues
of bankruptcy law. They are decided on procedural or factual grounds
or raise issues of state law, or otherwise applicable federal non-
bankruptcy law. Others are decided simply on the basis of controlling
precedent. After considering many possible sources for a control group
(the Bankruptcy Reporter, reported federal appellate bankruptcy deci-
sions, "leading decisions" drawn from bankruptcy casebooks, and
bankruptcy decisions from the United States Supreme Court), I set-
tled on the universe of federal appellate bankruptcy cases' for which
5. [Pragmatic]: Code for decisions that make legislative history, past practice, or policy
dispositive notwithstanding competing interpretations (if any) based upon the lan-
guage of the statute.
6. Result controlled by precedent: Decisions dictated by controlling precedent from the
same or a higher court.
7. Unable to determine: Please note in Comments why it was not possible to classify the
interpretive method.
Predictably, few cases were coded as "result controlled by precedent" (6). In the overruled
group, selecting the first published opinion from the highest court deciding the issue predeter-
mined that there would be few, if any, cases controlled by precedent. Similarly, the control group
was drawn from published decisions of Courts of Appeals for which certiorari was sought. Both
the standards for publication and for the grant of certiorari suggest that few cases controlled by
precedent would appear in the control group. In fact, many unpublished decisions eliminated
from the cluster samples, see infra note 69 and accompanying text, were dispositions that the
Court of Appeals had determined were controlled by circuit or Supreme Court precedent.
65. See DONALD T. CAMPBELL & JULIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL & QUASI-
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 13-24 (1963).
66. United States Law Week classifies cases filed in the Supreme Court by subject matter
and one of its classifications is "Bankruptcy." Cases so classified by United States Law Week
formed the universe out of which I randomly selected the control group.
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petitions for certiorari were acted upon by the Supreme Court s' be-
tween its 1982 and 1998 Terms,68 a total of 804 cases.
From this universe of cases I drew six random samples of thirty
cases each, for a total of 180 cases.8 In reading through these cases, I
excluded those where there was no reported opinion to analyze and
cases that did not raise issues of statutory interpretation under Title
11. I also excluded the one randomly selected case that happened also
to have been superseded by statute.0 The result is a control group of
fifty-two United States Court of Appeals cases raising issues of statu-
tory interpretation under Title 11 that were substantial enough to
merit a published appellate decision and a petition for certiorari.
These fifty-two cases were then summarized on a Data Collection
Form, based on the same coding instructions used for the overruled
cases collected in Appendix I." The list of fifty-two control cases is
found in Appendix Ill.
To assess the reliability and consistency of the coding, my re-
search assistant, John Pomeroy, and I independently coded the same
twenty-nine random cases. The consistency of our results exceeded
conventional levels of reliability for research of this kind.72
67. Cases for which Supreme Court review is sought are at least generally thought by the
interested parties to raise questions of federal law and given the well known standards for the
grant of certiorari set out in Supreme Court Rule 10, are likely to at least arguably involve legal
issues that have divided the lower federal courts.
68. Cases for which certiorari was sought prior to 1982 were very unlikely to involve inter-
pretations of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The Act did not apply to cases filed in the
bankruptcy court prior to October 1979, and it is unlikely that decisions in cases filed after that
date could be litigated through and decided by a Court of Appeals and a petition for certiorari
acted upon before October 1982.
69. After the 804 cases were entered into a computer database chronologically, the
SAMPLE function on SPSS, a statistical software package, selected successive groups of thirty
cases, which were then culled on the bases set forth in the text. After each sample was selected,
the cases within the selected sample were eliminated from the database to ensure that the same
case was not selected again at random from the universe. After examining the sixth successive
sample of thirty, I had fifty-two codable cases for the control group. I felt this was enough so I
stopped. This random sampling technique is sometimes referred to as cluster sampling. I used
this cluster sampling technique because I did not know in advance how many codable cases
would be found in a sample of any given size.
70. See Lincoln Sav. Bank v. Suffolk County Treasurer (In re Parr Meadows Racing Ass'n),
880 F.2d 1540 (2d Cir. 1989), superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394,
§ 116, 108 Stat. 4106, 4119 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(9) (1994)).
71. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
72. Inter-rater reliability of the coding of interpretive method was tested by the following
technique. Pomeroy and I independently coded the same twenty-nine cases. In five instances,
one or the other of us coded as indeterminate cases that the other assigned a number to on the
1-5 scale. In thirteen of the remaining twenty-four cases, we assigned the same number. In only
two of the remaining eleven cases did we disagree by more than one unit. Thus, except for these
two cases, if I coded the case as textualist (1), Pomeroy coded it as textualist (1) or primarily
textualist (2), and if I coded the case as primarily textualist (2), he assigned it textualist (1),
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Table 1 compares the cases in the two groups by category of in-
terpretive method:
TABLE 1: Overruled and Control Groups by
Interpretive Method
Interpretive Control Overruled Difference*
Method Group Cases
Textualist 10% 33% +23%
Primarily Textualist 8% 21% +13%
Textualist & Pragmatic 19% 22% +3%
Primarily Pragmatic 21% 7% -14%
Pragmatic 37% 7% -30%
Precedent 4% 0% -4%
Undetermined 2% 10% +8%
Sum
N 52 58 110
*Differences in first 5 categories p < .0001 (2-tailed t-test); p < .001 (chi-square).
Interestingly, even a casual look at the data indicates that tex-
tualism is not a dominant mode of statutory interpretation in the
Courts of Appeals, even in the bankruptcy area, notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's particular insistence for a decade on "plain meaning'
constructions of the Bankruptcy Code.73 Approximately 80 percent of
primarily textualist (2), or both textualist and pragmatic methods (3). In one case, Pomeroy
coded as 5 a case I had assigned a 3. In the second instance, he assigned 5 to a case I had coded
as 2. When we discussed these latter two cases, we agreed upon reflection that both should be
coded as 3 for purposes of the main study, though of course for purposes of the inter-rater reli-
ability test, our original codings stood. Other than the change in the coding of this one case,
United Mine Workers of Am. 1992 Benefit Plan v. Leckie Smokeless Coal Co. (In re Leckie Smoke-
less Coal Co.), 99 F.3d 573 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1118 (1997), for purposes of the
main study, my original coding was used. Statistical analysis of the results of the reliability
study indicates good consistency between the raters (y = .73, Pearson's r =.70, p < .001).
Pomeroy's mean assigned value for the twenty-four cases was 3.88 and mine was 3.96. A paired
sample t-test indicates this difference is not statistically significant (p =.42) and the small differ-
ence would have had no meaningful effect on the results of the main study had it used Pomeroy's
coding rather than mine.
73. This is consistent with the findings of Professor Zeppos in his analysis of twentieth-
century Supreme Court statutory cases. See Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1076 ('The data... suggest
a number of important findings: (1) the Court's use of authority is not originalist; (2) textual
sources, while important, are not exclusively relied upon; (3) practical-consequentialist consid-
erations and other dynamic sources are an acknowledged, important, and constant source of
authority in statutory interpretation.). In this respect, it appears that the Courts of Appeals do
as the Supreme Court does, rather than as it says.
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the control group cases were decided on largely or entirely nontextu-
alist grounds.
Note further that of the fifty-eight overruled cases, thirty-one
(54%) were decided on textualist or primarily textualist grounds, while
of the fifty-two cases in the control group, nine (18%) were decided on
textualist or primarily textualist grounds. Three times as many over-
ruled cases are textualist or primarily textualist. Conversely, thirty
control group cases (58%) were decided on pragmatic or primarily
pragmatic grounds. This is true of eight overruled cases (14%). That
is, more than four times as many control group cases are pragmatic or
primarily pragmatic.
Treating the categories of interpretive method used in the
coding as discrete and applying the chi-square test to determine sta-
tistical significance, these results are significant at the .001 level.
Treating the categories of interpretive method as a continuum and
applying the t-test procedure, the control group and overruled group
exhibit approximately equal variances but significantly different
means. The t-test confirms that the control group is significantly more
pragmatic than the overruled group, with results at the .0001 level of
significance. 4
Substantially the same results are obtained if only Court of
Appeals decisions from the overruled group are compared with the
control group. 5 The differences between the groups are not on account
of the fact that the overruled group includes bankruptcy court, district
court, and Supreme Court as well as Court of Appeals decisions.
There is virtually no chance that the larger number of prag-
matic interpretations observed in the control group is a random event.
The data strongly support the hypothesis that textualist decisions are
more likely to be overruled by Congress than pragmatic ones. 6
74. The mean value control group was 3.71 (.19 standard error). The mean value overruled
group was 2.27 (.17 standard error). For purposes of the t-test, the number of observations was
control group (49) and overruled group (52) on account of the necessity of disregarding cases that
were indeterminate or controlled by precedent.
75. The mean for the overruled Courts of Appeals decisions is 2.30 compared to 2.27 for all
overruled decisions. Because of its smaller size (23), the standard error of the mean for the over-
ruled Courts of Appeals decisions group is somewhat larger at 0.27. The distribution for the
overruled Courts of Appeals decisions as to interpretive method, however, is virtually identical to
Table 1, supra. If only Courts of Appeals decisions are compared to the control group, then the
chi-square test is significant at the .004 level and the t-test is significant at the <.001 level.
76. This finding is consistent with that of Eskridge's study of overruled Supreme Court de-
cisions, which found that "plain meaning" interpretations were substantially overrepresented in
the set of overruled Supreme Court cases, while "purpose or policy" based decisions were gener-




Cases subsequently overruled by Congress presumably do not
serve current policy goals well, at least in the view of Congress, which
after all has the constitutional prerogative to set bankruptcy policy.
The observation that overruled cases are disproportionately textualist
in method should trouble utilitarian-textualists. The observation is
consistent with pragmatic intuitions that pragmatic interpretation
leads to superior implementation of existing bankruptcy policy.
Moreover, overruled cases are likely to be inconsistent with the intent
of the enacting Congress as well. There is no evidence that as a gen-
eral matter bankruptcy policy has sufficiently changed within the last
twenty years such that, on average, honoring the intent of the drafters
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 would disserve current policy or
vice-versa. Most of the overruled cases that form the subject of this
research do not raise broad ideological issues, but rather deal with the
details of bankruptcy administration and policy. Corrective legislation
in such cases is likely to mean that the overruled case was inconsis-
tent with the intent of the enacting Congress as well as current policy.
If one accepts the proposition that cases subsequently over-
ruled by the Congress are not consistent with the legislative intent of
the enacting Congress, the observation that overruled cases are dis-
proportionately textualist in method should also trouble at least some
judges who adopt textualism for legitimacy reasons. This observation
is consistent with the pragmatic intuition that pragmatic interpreta-
tion leads on average to statutory interpretation that better approxi-
mates congressional intent."
The overruled cases decided on textualist reasoning may im-
properly apply textualist principles. I did not try to distinguish sound
and unsound textualism at work. Nevertheless, if courts consistently
end up with results that regularly require overruling because of in-
adequate facility with the textualist method, textualism remains a
less effective method in practice, whatever its merits in theory.
The median time required to overrule these cases was three
years, with a minimum of less than one year and a maximum of fif-
teen years. In twenty cases (34%), legislative correction took five or
more years. Overruling by amending the Code is clearly a time-
consuming business. Moreover, amending the Code is an uncertain
and faulty business. The overrulings generated substantial further
77. In any given case, honoring legislative intent and effectively implementing current
bankruptcy policy may, of course, be in tension with one another as policy may change over time.
See John C. Nagle, Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory Interpreter, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2209, 2215
(1995). They are not, however, necessarily in tension, and for the reasons given in the text are
not likely to be generally in tension in the overruled cases being studied.
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litigation or serious unintended consequences, or were botched, in
thirty-six instances (62%). While these figures simply aggregate my
subjective assessments of the efficacy of the amendment based upon
my general knowledge of bankruptcy law, experience, and judgment,
the types of problems created by reliance on legislative error correc-
tion are very real. A few examples of these incomplete or flawed over-
rulings will illustrate.
Bankruptcy law provides that a bankruptcy trustee may rein-
state defaulted contracts and leases that could not ordinarily be rein-
stated under otherwise applicable law if doing so would benefit the
bankruptcy estate. This power of "assumption" is conditioned upon
providing a cure of the defaults and adequate assurance of future per-
formance. The basic thought here is that there is no fundamental un-
fairness in holding the nondebtor party to a deal favorable to the es-
tate so long as defaults are cured and future performance assured.
The history of the Code indicates that while the 1973 Bank-
ruptcy Commission, whose work in large part formed the basis for the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, intended to generally permit bank-
ruptcy trustees to assume executory contracts, it was concerned about
the possible application of the assumption power to a contract calling
for the debtor's personal services." Where the debtor's personal serv-
ices were called for, and where otherwise applicable law provided that
the nondebtor could refuse to accept performance from anyone else, it
seemed wrong that the bankruptcy trustee should be permitted to
substitute his performance for that of the debtor. These quite sensible
considerations resulted in an exception to the assumption power that
in the original Bankruptcy Code was framed as follows: 'The trustee
may not assume.., any executory contract... if (1)(A) applicable law
excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract.., from ac-
cepting performance from or rendering performance to the trustee or
to an assignee of such contract." 9
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which contained this pro-
vision, became effective on October 1, 1979.' It soon became apparent
that the drafters had not fully appreciated how this language might be
interpreted in a Chapter 11 case-where typically there is no trustee,
since the debtor continues to operate its business and manage its
property as debtor-in-possession. In such a case, starting from first
78. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 199 (1973) (committee report). See, e.g., In re Taylor Mfg.,
Inc., 6 B.R. 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (holding that a lease of real property was not a personal
service that could not be assigned).
79. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 365, 92 Stat. 2549, 2575 (1978).
80. See id. § 402, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
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principles there is little reason to preclude the debtor from assuming
his or her own personal services contract and continuing to render the
personal services called for. Nevertheless, two early cases literally ap-
plied this statute to prevent assumption by a debtor in possession on
the ground that applicable law would excuse the nondebtor from ac-
cepting performance from a "trustee or an assignee" if there were
one.
81
As early as July 1980, wheels were set in motion to correct the
problem with § 365(c)(1)(A). Section 27 of Senate Bill 658 (entitled "An
act to correct technical errors, clarify and make minor substantive
changes to [the Bankruptcy Code]") was introduced and proposed to
substitute "an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession"
in lieu of "the trustee" in § 365(c)(1)(A)Y Both this bill and a successor
technical corrections bill introduced in the following Congress' fell by
the wayside in the press of legislative business, but in 1984 Congress
passed the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act" in
order to reconstruct the jurisdictional foundations of the bankruptcy
system in the wake of Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co.' Attached to this legislation as a miscellaneous techni-
cal amendment was the change to § 365(c)(1)(A) proposed first in 1980.
Unfortunately, the next court decision on the subject construed
the now amended statute to achieve the same objectionable re-
sult-precluding a Chapter 11 debtor from assuming its own personal
services contract.' It turns out that merely substituting "an entity
other than the debtor or debtor in possession" for "the trustee" left the
critical provision reading: 'The trustee may not assume ... an execu-
tory contract.., if (1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than
the debtor, to such contract.., from accepting performance from or
rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or debtor in
81. See In re Harms, 10 B.R. 817, 822 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981) (holding that limited partner-
ship agreements were not assumable executory contracts under the Bankruptcy Code); Govern-
ment Nat'l Mortgage Corp. v. Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (In re Adana Mortgage Bankers,
Inc.), 12 B.R. 977, 986 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (guaranty agreements).
82. S. 658, 96th Cong. § 27(b) (1980). S. 658 was accompanied by a Committee Report,
which optimistically explained the technical change to § 365(c)(1):
This amendment makes it clear that the prohibition against a trustee's power to assume
an executory contract does not apply where it is the debtor that is in possession and the
performance to be given or received under a personal service contract will be the same as
if no petition had been filed.
H.R. Rep. No. 96-1195, § 27(b) (1980).
83. See S. 863, 97th Cong. § 27(b) (1981).
84. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333 (1984).
85. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
86. See Pennsylvania Peer Review Org. v. United States (In re Pennsylvania Peer Review
Org.), 50 B.R. 640, 645-47 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1985).
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possession or to an assignee of such contract."8 7 Of course this sentence
read literally still says that if the nondebtor could refuse to accept per-
formance from an assignee under otherwise applicable law, the con-
tract cannot be assumed in bankruptcy.
In 1986, in connection with the agricultural crisis in the farm
belt, Congress turned its attention to the Bankruptcy Code again. And
so a second technical amendment to § 365(c)(1)(A) was now attached
to the Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmer
Bankruptcy Act of 1986.' The technical amendment deleted the
phrase "or to an assignee of such contract" leaving the critical provi-
sion to now read: 'The trustee may not assume.., an executory con-
tract ... if (1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the
debtor, to such contract.., from accepting performance from or ren-
dering performance to an entity other than the debtor or debtor in
possession."89 But of course this sentence read literally still provides
that "if applicable law excuses" the nondebtor from accepting perform-
ance "from a party other than the debtor or the debtor in possession,"
then the contract may not be assumed. In 1988, in In re West Electron-
ics, Inc., the Third Circuit held that § 365(c)(1)(A) as twice amended
still meant that the Chapter 11 debtor could not assume its own con-
tract if that contract were not assignable under otherwise applicable
law." The West Electronics court made no attempt to ascertain the
purpose of the 1984 and 1986 Amendments.
For a while it looked as though West Electronics would wither
and die in the face of strongly critical cases from several bankruptcy
courts and the First Circuit rejecting its holding and finding that the
true meaning (if not the literal language) of the 1984 and 1986
Amendments was to clarify that in a Chapter 11 case the debtor-in-
possession (but not a trustee or assignee) could assume the debtor's
personal service and other non-assignable contracts.9 ' But just as relief
set in that the §365(c)(1)(A) problem was finally, though not elegantly,
taken care of, in In re Catapult Entertainment, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
87. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 365, 92 Stat. 2549, 2575, as amended by Act of
July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 362.
88. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 283(e), 100 Stat. 3088, 3124 (1986).
89. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A) as amended by Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and
Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 283(e), 100 Stat. 3088, 3124
(1986).
90. In re West Electronics, Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83-84 (3d Cir. 1988).
91. See, e.g., Summitt Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608 (1st Cir. 1995); Texaco Inc.
v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 136 B.R. 658 (M.D. La. 1992) (allowing Chapter 11 debtor




joined the Third in construing the statute literally to preclude as-
sumption by the debtor of contracts nonassignable under otherwise
applicable law." Catapult Entertainment settled with certiorari pend-
ing and the Supreme Court accordingly dismissed the case but did not
vacate the Ninth Circuit decision." After twenty years and two "clari-
fying amendments" we still have not resolved what would seem an
elementary and noncontroversial point of Chapter 11 practice-and
the ball is now back in Congress' hands. One can only hope that the
third time is the charm."
The story of § 365(c)(1)(A) reads like the plot of The Marx
Brothers Amend The Bankruptcy Code. Section 365(c)(1)(A) is an ex-
treme example. But it turns out that botched, incomplete, and tardy
amendments are the norm in bankruptcy law. Two less aggravated,
but more typical, examples follow.
In Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp., the Seventh Circuit
created an enormous stir in the bankruptcy field when it held (pri-
marily based on a highly technical parsing of the applicable statutes,
but with supporting policy-based arguments) that payments to a third
party creditor that reduced an insider's liability on a guarantee to that
creditor constituted a voidable preference recoverable from the third
party creditor." The effect of this ruling was to extend the voidable
preference period for creditors holding insider guarantees from ninety
days (the period applicable to ordinary creditors) to one year (the pe-
riod applicable for insiders). In the 1994 Amendments, Congress
added a new subsection to the Code that narrowly overruled Levity.
92. Perlman v. Catapult Entertainment, Inc. (In re Catapult Entertainment, Inc.), 165 F.3d
747, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1999).
93. Perlman v. Catapult Entertainment, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 369 (1999). See United States Ban-
corp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18 (1994) (denying motion to vacate
judgment below in case mooted by settlement).
94. Congress is in fact revisiting § 365(c)(1)(A), see H.R. 833, 106th Cong. § 305 (1999), even
proposing a conforming amendment to § 365(e)(2) to remove the current discontinuity between
these two subsections that raises the anomalous possibility of § 365 authorizing ipso facto termi-
nation of an otherwise assumable executory contract. See Summitt Inv. & Dev. Corp., 69 F.3d at
613 (holding that Congress intended to permit a debtor to avoid automatic termination and not-
ing the "absurd result" that would occur if § 365(e)(2) were read otherwise); In re Cardinal In-
dus., Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 976-82 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990). The lack of such conforming provisions
in the 1984 and 1986 Amendments is perhaps more understandable than the failure to properly
word § 365(c)(1)(A), but equally artless. H.R. 833 is a controversial and comprehensive bank-
ruptcy reform bill whose fate remains uncertain as of this writing. A companion bill has passed
the Senate without these technical amendments to § 365. See S. 625, 106th Cong. (1999).
95. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1194-99 (7th Cir. 1989). In the bank-
ruptcy community, this notorious case is usually referred to as DePrizio, the name of the debtor
involved in the case.
96. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 202, 108 Stat. 4106, 4121
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1994)).
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Levit, however, had generated much respectable commentary specu-
lating on how far its reasoning reached. 7 Even those who generally
approved of the holding in Levit on statutory or policy grounds, found
the implications of Levit's theory of recovery of one person's preference
from an initial transferee, who had taken in good faith and for value,
troubling. Unfortunately, the 1994 Amendment does nothing to clarify
the situation with regard to recovery of indirect preferences, it only
reverses the result in the particular case of the insider guarantee." We
are left with a statute that arguably implicitly ratifies the least defen-
sible extensions of the Levit reasoning, while reversing the Levit re-
sult.99 Congress is trying again to address one aspect of the continuing
Levit problem in a technical amendment attached to pending omnibus
bankruptcy reform legislation.'"
In Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co., the Fifth Cir-
cuit voided a regularly conducted state law foreclosure sale of real
property as a constructive fraud on creditors, relying on provisions of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, substantially carried forward into the
Bankruptcy Code, that make transfers by insolvents for less than rea-
sonably equivalent value voidable.'"' Although the literal statutory
language was amenable to this construction, the decision appalled real
estate lenders who had confidently assumed that so long as they com-
plied with state law foreclosure statutes, foreclosure sales could not be
upset because of mere inadequacy of price.0 2 The story of the botched
attempt in 1984 to overrule Durrett by statute is recounted by Justice
Souter in dissent in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp."3 In short, the anti-
Durrett forces attempted to amend two sections of the Code, one ex-
pressly bringing foreclosure sales under fraudulent transfer law and
the second to create a safe harbor within the fraudulent transfer stat-
97. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 191-92 (rev. ed. 1993).
98. See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 366-69 (1997).
99. See, e.g., Roost v. Associates Home Equity Servs., Inc. (In re Williams), 234 B.R. 801,
803-04 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1999); Richard C. Josephson, The DePrizio Override: Don't Kiss Those
Waivers Goodbye Yet, 4 BuS. L. TODAY 40 (1994); Adam A. Lewis, "Did It or Didn't It'? The De-
Prizio Dilemma, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20 (1995); John C. Murray, DePrizio Lives (in a Mobile
Home in Oregon), 18 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 14 (1999); Lawrence Ponoroff, Now You See It, Now
You Don't: An Unceremonious Encore for Two-Transfer Thinking in the Analysis of Indirect Pref-
erences, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 203, 203 (1995); Robert Millner, Is DePrizio Dead... or Just
Wounded? Lien Avoidance as a Post-reform Act Remedy for Trilateral Preferences, LENDER
LIABILITY NEWS, May 19, 1995, at 12-13.
100. H.R. 833, 106th Cong. § 1116 (1999); S. 625, 106th Cong. § 1216 (1999).
101. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1980).
102. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 603-04 (3d ed.
1993).
103. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 553-54 & n.6 (1994) (Souter, J., dissent-
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ute for regularly conducted, non-collusive foreclosures. Only the first
change made it into the final statute, with the effect being to entrench
Durrett rather than overrule it. Durrett was finally overruled by the
Supreme Court in BFP ten years later in the teeth of the literal lan-
guage of the amendment first proposed by the putative Durrett over-
rulers."M
The point from these examples is that the Bankruptcy Code is
complicated and amendments often have unintended consequences, or
fail in part, or, sometimes, fail completely. 5 This appears to be equally
true of amendments overruling textualist or primarily textualist deci-
sions as it is of more pragmatic judicial decisions." Relying on legisla-
tion to correct judicial misinterpretations is like relying on surgery to
correct ills caused by misprescribed drugs. It is costly, risky, and
rarely as efficacious as administering the correct medicine in the first
place.
Establishing that overruled decisions are disproportionately
textualist is instructive, but not conclusive, on the question of which
interpretive method leads to more aggregate error. The vast majority
of judicial errors, whether based on textualism, pragmatism, or other-
wise, are never corrected; they are acquiesced in because statutory
overruling is costly, uncertain, time consuming, and often impractica-
ble. These uncorrected errors might not be disproportionately textu-
alist in origin or the magnitude of the injustice worked by the textu-
alist errors in the aggregate might be less than that of the errors of
pragmatists, even if the number of textualist errors is greater. Textu-
alists and pragmatists will predictably disagree on these points. One's
intuition here is informed by one's belief in the integrity and compe-
tence of the judiciary. The evidence from bankruptcy, however, shows
that the clearest and most costly errors-the ones requiring legislative
correction-are disproportionately textualist in origin.
104. See id; see also supra note 11.
105. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
106. No statistically significant relationship (Pearson's r = .08) appears between efficacy of
overruling and interpretive method. 'rextualist" or "primarily textualist" decisions were ineffi-





A. Congress Does Pay Attention To Bankruptcy Court Cases
A large number of bankruptcy court decisions were identified
as the leading authority for an overruled interpretation. Table 2 below
summarizes the data.
TABLE 2: Overruled Cases by Court
Court Number Percent
Supreme Court 7 12%
Court of Appeals 24 41%
District Court 4 7%
Bankruptcy Court 23 40%
Total 58 100%
Recall that the method I adopted provided that whenever a Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, or District
Court had adopted the interpretation at issue in a reasoned, published
opinion, I would code the opinion from the higher court and disregard
the bankruptcy court decision. Nevertheless, twenty-three cases (40%)
in the overruled sample are bankruptcy court decisions. While it may
in part reflect the law professor's tendency to focus on appellate deci-
sions, I was surprised by this. I imagined that bankruptcy court deci-
sions would have very low visibility with the Congress and that those
adversely affected by bankruptcy court decisions would be far more
likely to appeal or relitigate the issue in the next case than to seek an
amendment from Congress.
In part, the large number of bankruptcy decisions overruled
may reflect the difficulty of obtaining appellate review under existing
law. I have noted elsewhere that "[i]t is an irony of bankruptcy prac-
tice that an order may be nonappealable on finality grounds until it
becomes nonappealable on mootness grounds."'0 ' Although there has
been considerable judicial flexibility with respect to appellate review
of technically interlocutory orders," that flexibility has produced great
107. Bussel, supra note 59, at 1070.
108. The "final judgment rule" bars review of most trial court rulings in the federal system
until the conclusion of the litigation on the merits by the entry of judgment. See Catlin v. United
States, 324 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1945); 15A & B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ETAL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 3905-3915 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1999). In bankruptcy cases, the rights and liabili-
ties of particular parties are frequently decisively determined before the final resolution of the
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confusion."° There is less confusion regarding mootness, because the
doctrine largely continues to be rigorously applied, creating a substan-
tial barrier to meaningful appellate review."'
case through confirmation, dismissal, closing, or abstention. See generally Millers Cove Energy
Co. v. Moore (In re Millers Cove Energy Co.), 128 F.3d 449 (6th Cir. 1997); Vylene Enters., Inc. v.
Naugles, Inc. (In re Vylene Enters., Inc.), 968 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Saco Local Dev.
Corp., 711 F.2d 441 (lst Cir. 1983). The Courts of Appeals have not been blind to the fact that
rigid application of the final judgment rule in bankruptcy would result in rendering most bank-
ruptcy court rulings unreviewable. See 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra, § 3926.2. See, e.g., In re Matin
Motor Oil, Inc., 689 F.2d 445, 448-49 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1207 (1983); Suburban
Bank of Cary Grove v. Riggsby (In re Riggsby), 745 F.2d 1153, 1154-55 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Saco
Local Dev. Corp., 711 F.2d at 443-45. They have struggled to come up with a "pragmatic" defini-
tion of finality appropriate to the bankruptcy process. See Bonner Mall Partnership v. United
States Bancorp Mortgage Co. (In re Bonner Mall Partnership), 2 F.3d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
dismissed as moot, 513 U.S. 18 (1994); Mason v. Integrity Ins. Co. (In re Mason), 709 F.2d 1313,
1318 (9th Cir. 1983). In doing so, they have sought to draw on the traditions of the bankruptcy
system itself which, before the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, provided generously for inter-
locutory appeal. In part, this may reflect bankruptcy's roots in the English Chancery Court. See 1
WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 470-73 (7th ed. 1956). Interlocutory review was
liberally available in the English Chancery Court. See id. at 438 (permitting review even "upon the
most trivial points). The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided for interlocutory review of bankruptcy
proceedings, but not "controversies in bankruptcy." Saco Local Dev. Corp., 711 F.2d at 444-45; Mur-
phy & Robinson Inv. Co. v. Cross (In re Cross), 666 F.2d 873, 877 (5th Cir. 1982). The "proceeding-
controversy" distinction predictably caused substantial confusion. See In re Brissette, 561 F.2d 779,
781 (9th Cir. 1977) (characterizing the distinction as "obscure and indefensibly confusing). The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 seemed to have simplified matters by abolishing the proceeding-
controversy distinction and permitting the Courts of Appeals to review all final orders and only final
orders without reference to the character of the dispute resolved by the order. But the Courts of
Appeals have perpetuated the proceeding-controversy distinction in attempting to sort out what
counts as "final" under the current statutes. Orders resolving "proceedings" count as "final" under
the modern cases because this permits appeal under the current statutes-and this follows the "tra-
dition" of allowing interlocutory review of such matters under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See Saco
Local Dev. Corp., 711 F.2d at 445. The Courts of Appeals have also made liberal use of two limited
exceptions to the final judgment rule generally known as the "collateral order doctrine," (see, e.g.,
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)), and the Forgay-Conrad rule. See
Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848). The collateral order doctrine permits interlocutory
review of a final determination of rights collateral to the case that will be "irreparably" lost if
appeal is delayed and which are "too important" to be denied review. The Forgay-Conrad rule
creates an overlapping category of immediately reviewable orders-those which result in the
immediate and permanent disposition of property. In addition, the Supreme Court has held
that, as in nonbankruptcy federal civil litigation, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) allows the Courts of Appeal
to accept certified appeals from the federal district courts in their discretion. See Connecticut
Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992); see also infra note 109.
109. The combination of the traditional rigid final judgment rule and the expansive scope of
the many "exceptions" and "pragmatic interpretations" available and liberally applied in bank-
ruptcy cases leads predictably to chaos. Almost no order rendered by a bankruptcy court is
"truly" final, and so, if the appellate court wills it, then review under the final judgment rule can
be denied. Almost any order, however, can, if the appellate court wills it, be fitted within one of
the pragmatically created and applied exceptions.
The finality of district court dispositions of interlocutory bankruptcy court decisions creates nice
logical puzzles. The jurisdictional statutes authorize discretionary interlocutory review in the dis-
trict court or the bankruptcy appellate panels. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) & (b) (1994). If the district
court "finally" disposes of the matter by reversing an interlocutory order of the bankruptcy court,
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then can the district court order be reviewed under the final judgment rule? Theoretical possibilities
abound, but the Courts of Appeals have generally resisted assuming jurisdiction in this situation.
See, e.g., In re Brown, 916 F.2d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1990). The most perplexing difficulty is deter-
mining the finality of a district court disposition of an appeal from a final bankruptcy court or-
der. If the district court simply affirms a final bankruptcy court order, the district court action is
clearly final as well, and appealable. But if the district court reverses and remands, there is
considerable confusion in the cases regarding the finality of the district court action and accord-
ingly the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. Collier, opting for understatement, notes
inter- and intra-circuit splits on the question and describes it as "unresolved." 1 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 5.09[1], at 5-36 (15th ed. 1996). See, e.g., Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Delta Re-
sources, Inc. (In re Delta Resources, Inc.), 54 F.3d 722, 727 (11th Cir.) (requiring "significant judicial
activity" on remand renders district court order interlocutory), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 980 (1995);
Conroe Office Bldg. Ltd. v. Nichols (In re Nichols), 21 F.3d 690, 692 (5th Cir. 1994) (denying review of
district court order regarding automatic stay); Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d at 903-04 (deter-
mining appealability by difficult balancing of competing policies), cert. dismissed as moot, 513 U.S. 18
(1994); In re West Elecs., Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 81-82 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining that pragmatic approach
requires appellate review of important question notwithstanding remand to bankruptcy court); Rigg-
sby, 745 F.2d at 1155-56 (holding that remand order is not final); see generally John P. Hennigan,
Toward Regularizing Appealability in Bankruptcy, 12 BANKI DEV. J. 583 (1996).The result of all this is great confusion and ad hocery. Jurisdiction seems to turn on the par-
ticular appellate court's perception of the "importance" of a particular decision and its effect on
the losing party below. And under the "cumulative finality" principle, an order's finality can be
determined by events subsequent to its entry. See In re Szekely, 936 F.2d 897, 900 (7th Cir. 1991).
Many judges and commentators have noted the untoward effects of the existing ambiguity over
the Courts of Appeals' jurisdiction. See 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 108, at § 3926; Edith H.
Jones, Bankruptcy Appeals, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 245, 253 (1991) (discussing "bewildering array
of decisions on finality); Preston T. Towber, A Uniform Approach To Determining Finality in Bank-
ruptcy Appeals Under 28 U.S.C. Section 158(d), 29 S. TEX. L. REV. 587, 587-589 (1988) (discussing
jurisdictional quagmire); see also In re Market Square Inn, Inc., 978 F.2d 116, 124 (3d Cir. 1992)
(Stapleton, J., dissenting) ('[lit is time for our court to review our jurisprudence and give some con-
tent to the concept of finality in bankruptcy cases. The current situation is intolerable.'); accord In re
BH & P, Inc., 949 F.2d 1300, 1319-20 (3d Cir. 1991) (Hutchinson, J., concurring and dissenting). The
National Bankruptcy Review Commission advocates broadening appellate review of interlocutory
bankruptcy court orders. See National Bankruptcy Review Commission Report, at Rec. 3.1.4 re-
printed in COLLIER, APP. G, supra note 46.
The availability of interlocutory review of district court decisions (but not BAP decisions) un-
der § 1292(b) is a possible route for resolution of some important legal questions that arise in
interlocutory orders. But § 1292(b) is viewed by the Article III courts as reserved for exceptional
matters. See 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 108, at §§ 3929-30 (noting inter alia "sparing utilization"
of certification procedure); see also Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), 88 HARV. L. REV. 607, 607-08 nn. 5 & 6 (1975). There appear to have been only ap-
proximately fourteen such appeals accepted in bankruptcy cases in the more than seven years
between March 10, 1992 and August, 1999. I determined the number of § 1292(b) appeals by
searching LEXIS, BKRTCY library, COURTS file (Search Terms: 1292(b) and DATE AFT 3/10/92)
and identifying the cases in that search that involved § 1292(b) appeals that had been accepted by
the Courts of Appeals. This methodology assumes that the Courts of Appeals will cite § 1292(b)
when deciding an appeal under that subsection, a logical and customary reference, but not inevita-
ble. I selected the March 10, 1992 date because before Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503
U.S. 249 (1992), there was a substantial question in the lower federal courts whether the § 1292(b)
certification procedure was available in bankruptcy cases.
110. Traditional statements of the bankruptcy mootness doctrine can be found in In re Con-
tinental Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 565 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1057 (1997);
Onouli-Kona Land Co. v. Richards (In re Onouli-Kona Land Co.), 846 F.2d 1170, 1172-73 (9th Cir.
1988); In re AOVIndus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1986); In re Abbotts Dairies, 788 F.2d
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Alternatively, Congress may, presumably at the behest of af-
fected constituencies, simply be unusually proactive in identifying
bankruptcy court decisions that reveal a need for clarifying amend-
ments, even in situations where Court of Appeals review might be
available. In any event, whether or not owing to lack of access to ap-
pellate review, it does appear that those adversely affected by bank-
ruptcy court decisions have more than occasionally successfully ob-
tained relief from Congress, thereby bypassing the appeals route alto-
gether.
B. Geography Matters
One striking additional finding from this research is that the
incidence of overruled decisions is not randomly distributed across the
nation. While there were insufficient numbers of cases to compare the
incidence of overruling on a circuit-by-circuit basis, it is apparent on a
regional basis that cases from the Northeast are substantially over-
represented in the overruled group and cases from the West are sub-
stantially under-represented.
In order to perform a chi-square test to establish the statistical
significance of this geographic difference, I classified all overruled
cases from any court (bankruptcy court, district court, and court of
appeals) within the jurisdiction of the First, Second, Third, and Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuits as "Northeast." Similarly, cases from the
Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits were classified as "South," the
Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits became '"Midwest," and the Ninth
and Tenth Circuits, 'West." The results are summarized in Table 3.
143, 150 n.6 (3d Cir. 1986); Trone v. Roberts Farms, Inc. (In re Roberts Farms, Inc.), 652 F.2d 793,
798 (9th Cir. 1981); 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 108, § 3533.2. Perhaps in the last few years
appellate courts have begun to exhibit more willingness to review appeals from unstayed confirma-
tion orders. See, e.g., In re 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 126 F.3d 955, 961 (7th Cir. 1997),
rev'd on other grounds, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999).
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TABLE 3: Overruled and Control Groups by Region
Region Control Group Overruled Cases Difference*
Northeast 14% 41% +27%
Midwest 21% 29% +8%
South 27% 18% -9%
West 39% 12% -27%
Sum
N 52 51** 103
* p < .001 (chi-square)
** 7 overruled Supreme Court cases not classified in any region.
The differences in regional distribution between the overruled
and control groups is statistically significant at the .001 level. The
magnitude of the under-representation of overruled cases arising in
the South is modest, as is the overrepresentation of cases from the
Midwest. But the magnitude of over-representation of Northeast cases
and under-representation of West cases is very large and calls for ex-
planation. More than three times the percentage of cases from the
Northeast appear in the overruled group as in the control. Further
analysis indicates that with a 95% level of confidence one can predict
that between 1.7 and 11.9 times as many cases from the Northeast
appear in the overruled cases as would result from random selection."'
This regional skewing within the overruled group raises the
possibility that the observed difference in method between the control
and overruled groups is actually driven by region rather than method.
Thus, if, for reasons independent of method, cases from the Northeast
are more likely to be overruled, and Northeastern courts are more
likely to be textualist, then the disproportionate number of textualist
decisions in the overruled group could be owing to where the cases
originate from rather than how they are reasoned.
In fact, this is not so. Table 4 shows that across all regions,
overruled decisions are more textualist in nature than control cases.
These differences are statistically significant in all regions except the
West, where the small number of overruled cases makes statistical
111. The odds of any given overruled case being from the Northeast region are 21:30.
Within the control group the odds are 7:45. The ratio between these two figures is 4.5:1. The
Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel test statistic reveals that this disparity between the control and over-
ruled groups is statistically significant at the .001 level. One can be 95% confident that the ac-
tual disparity in the number of Northeast region cases between the overruled group and the
whole universe from which the control was drawn is between 1.7:1 and 11.9:1.
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comparison difficult. Nevertheless even in the West, the overruled
cases appear to be on average more textualist in nature."'
TABLE 4: Overruled and Control Groups Mean
Method Rating by Region
Cell entries are means of interpretation scores, 1--Textualist, 5=Pragmatic
(Figures in parentheses are numbers of cases per cell.)
Region Control Group Overruled Cases Difference
Northeast 4.5 2.3 -2.2
(6) (18)
Midwest 3.5 2.1 -1.4
(10) (15)
South 3.7 1.9 -1.8
(14) (7)
West 3.6 2.4 -1.2
(19) (5)
TOTAL 3.7 2.2 -1.5
(49) (45)
Having ruled out regional differences in the use of textualism
as the explanation for the regional skewing, I tentatively suggest five
possible cumulative explanations for the observed regional disparity.
First, the over-representation from the Northeast may be an artifact
of the selection of "leading cases" for analysis as the overruled group.
It may be that 'leading cases" disproportionately come from the
Northeast. Second, courts in the South and especially the West,
whether through superior judicial decisionmaking, or otherwise, may
decide fewer cases in need of legislative correction. Third, Northeast
decisions in need of legislative correction may be more visible to Con-
gress either because of geographic proximity or because powerful con-
stituencies are more affected by such decisions. Certainly the elite
bankruptcy bar, banking, and securities industries continue to be cen-
tered in New York and may be less sanguine about living with adverse
Second Circuit decisions than decisions elsewhere. Fourth, this North-
112. This result is confirmed by analysis of variance using group and region as independent
variables and mean method rating as a continuous dependent variable. Again, the means of the
control and overruled groups are significantly different (p <.0001), but there is no main effect for
region (p=.419 ), nor for the region by group interaction (p=. 6 06 ). Overall, interpretive style did
not differ across regions (as indicated by the non-significant main effect for region), and more
importantly, the differences between the overruled and control groups did not change signifi-
cantly across the four regions (as indicated by the non-significant interaction between the inde-
pendent variables).
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eastern view of the world may be reinforced by the well-documented
concentration of very large bankruptcy reorganization cases in the
Southern District of New York and Delaware.113 The stakes are higher
if the Second or Third Circuit errs badly because more of the very
largest cases fall within their jurisdiction. Finally, the West is domi-
nated by the very large Ninth Circuit, whose decisions, it has been
noted, have during much of the period under study been dispropor-
tionately corrected by the Supreme Court rather than the Congress.1 '
C. Timing Matters
The overruled group disproportionately includes older cases.
Given that the median amount of time between decision and super-
seding amendment for the cases on Appendix I is three years and that
the last major amendment to the Code was in 1994,1'5 one would ex-
pect to see very few post-1994 cases in the overruled group. Indeed,
there are none. On the other hand, there were increasing numbers of
bankruptcy cases, bankruptcy appeals, and certiorari petitions in
bankruptcy cases throughout this period, suggesting an over-
representation of later cases in the control group."'
It is nevertheless noteworthy that in the period 1979-1984,
twenty-two cases (38%) destined for overruling were decided while
only four cases (8%) from the control group date from this period. The
overruled group also includes eighteen cases (31%) from 1985-1989 as
compared to thirteen (25%) in the control. From 1990-1994 there are
eighteen overruled cases (31%) and thirty-five control cases (67%). A
113. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble With Chapter 11, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 729, 754 n.107;
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large Publicly-Held Firms, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 11, 26-33. I note that six of the
fifty-eight cases in the overruled group involve debtors with assets exceeding $100 million while
there were three such cases (yielding four opinions for analysis) in the fifty-two case control
group. Compare. infra Appendices I & III, with Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research Data-
base, CaseName Field (unpub. database updated Sept. 25, 1999) (on file with author).
114. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Ninth Circuit Maintains Reversal Record, L.A. TIMES, July 3,
1995, at A5.
115. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106.
116. In Statistical Year 1982, there were 367,866 bankruptcy cases and 509 bankruptcy ap-
peals filed in the Courts of Appeals. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 199, 388 tbl. F-1, B-3 (1982). The mean
annual number of petitions for certiorari filed from 1982-1984 and classified as bankruptcy cases
by U.S. Law Week was thirty-five. See Daniel J. Bussel, Bankruptcy Certiorari Cases (unpub.
database created 1999) (on file with author). In Statistical Year 1998, there were 1,436,964
bankruptcy cases and 1203 bankruptcy appeals filed. See Administrative Office of the United
States Courts <http://www.uscourts.gov/dirrpt98/index.html> tbl. F-1, B-3. The mean annual
number of cases on certiorari for 1995-1997 was fifty-five. See Daniel J. Bussel, Bankruptcy
Certiorari Cases 1982-1998 (unpub. database created 1999) (on file with author).
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chi-square test establishes that these differences are statistically sig-
nificant at the .001 level.
Again, the differences between the control and overruled
groups in the 1990s may simply reflect the fact that not enough time
has passed for Congress to overrule a fully proportionate share of re-
cent decisions, and it may still get around to it. On the other hand, the
relatively large number of overruled cases in the 1979-1984 period
may be a reflection of the inevitable learning period for courts, liti-
gants, and Congress in implementing and administering a complex
new statute. Given these considerations, it is somewhat surprising
that almost as many overruled cases date from the period 1990-1994
as during this initial learning phase. Since textualism is associated
with overruling, perhaps the prominent rise of textualism in the late
1980s accounts in part for this observation.
D. Constituency Adversely Affected Probably Matters
In designing this research, I hypothesized that decisions ad-
versely affecting bankruptcy trustees and debtors were less likely to
be overruled by statute because of the absence of a powerful political
constituency capable of enlisting the political support necessary to
amend the Code."' This hypothesis was weakly supported by the data.
Table 5 classifies the overruled and control groups by prevailing party.
TABLE 5: Overruled and Control Groups
by Prevailing Party
Prevailing Party Control Group Overruled Cases Difference
Debtor 35% 48% +13%
Trustee 6% 13% +7%
Other 60% 39% -21%
Sum
N 52 54* 106
*Four overruled cases not involving debtor or bankruptcy trustee as party-litigant ex-
cluded. p = .085 (chi-square); p = .05 (Mantel-Haenszel).
Table 5 indicates that, as hypothesized, cases in which the
debtor or trustee prevailed were somewhat over-represented in the
overruled group where 48 percent of the cases could be characterized
117. In the bankruptcy context, debtors and trustees roughly correspond to the "diffuse citi-
zenry" that fared poorly in overriding adverse Supreme Court decisions in the Eskridge study.
See Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 3, 348-49, 351-52.
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as debtor victories and 13 percent as trustee victories. In the control
group the comparable percentages are 35 percent and 6 percent re-
spectively. This finding is at the borderline of statistical significance
at the conventional .05 level."8 When the figures for debtors and trus-
tees are aggregated and compared against the number of non-debtor,
non-trustee prevailing parties in Table 6 below, the result is signifi-
cant at the .05 level." Nevertheless, neither the magnitude of the dis-
parity nor the probability level associated with these findings provides
a high degree of assurance that the result is non-random.
TABLE 6: Overruled and Control Groups by Prevailing
Party-Debtor and Trustee Aggregated
Prevailing Party Control Group Overruled Cases Difference
Debtor or Trustee 40% 61% +21%
Other 60% 39% -21%
Sum
N 52 54* 106
*Four overruled cases not involving debtor or bankruptcy trustee as party-litigant ex-
cluded. p =.033 (chi-square); p = .051 (Fisher's exact 2-tail test).
E. Judges' Gender, Season, Chapter, Separate Writing Do Not Matter
In the course of reading and summarizing the overruled and
control cases, I gathered information regarding (a) the gender of the
writing judges, (b) the month the decision was published, (c) the
Bankruptcy Code chapter under which the case was filed, and (d) the
existence of any separate writing. For purposes of statistical analysis,
comparing the overruled and control groups on a month-by-month ba-
sis was infeasible because of the size of the samples. I did, however,
perform a chi-square test for the two groups based on the calendar
quarter in which the decision was published.
No statistically significant difference existed between control
and overruled groups with respect to the judges' gender or the calen-
dar quarter of decision. Indeed, the results appear to be purely ran-
dom for these factors. This result is reassuring, as I had no particular
118. The probability of this disparity occurring randomly is p =.085 (chi-square); p =.05
(Mantel-Haenszel).
119. The probability of this disparity occurring randomly is p = .033 (chi-square); p = .051
(Fisher's exact 2-tail test).
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reason to think that these factors would be significantly related with
the incidence of overruling.
More disappointing, I found no statistically significant rela-
tionship between separate writing and overruling." Accordingly, there
is no evidence to support my initial hypothesis that decisions that suf-
ficiently troubled Congress to warrant overruling were more likely to
elicit dissent or separate concurrence when decided. In fact, the raw
data may suggest quite the contrary. Only one Court of Appeals deci-
sion of the twenty-four such cases in the overruled group121 provoked
separate writing while seven of the fifty-two Court of Appeals cases in
the control group did. The chi-square test establishes that this dispar-
ity is not statistically significant,1" but nevertheless these data seem
to undercut one classic rationale for separate writing--drawing the
attention of the legislature to a problem to encourage improvement of
the law through new legislation. Congress appears to be moved by re-
sults it disapproves of rather than dissenting or concurring opinions.
The chi-square test was also unable to establish a statistically
significant relationship between Bankruptcy Code chapter and inci-
dence of overruling, but the results suggest Chapter 13 cases may be
somewhat more likely to be overturned.
120. This finding is in sharp contrast to that of Professor Eskridge in his analysis of over-
ruled Supreme Court decisions. See Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 3, at 350 & tbl. 8 ('Deci-
sions subject to judiciary committee scrutiny were much more likely to have a dissenting opinion
and to reflect close division on the Court; this was particularly true of decisions that were ulti-
mately overridden."). These divergent results may arise because of the different time periods
covered by the studies, or perhaps more likely, because unanimous or near-unanimous Supreme
Court decisions receive greater legislative deference than the lower federal court decisions ana-
lyzed here.
121. Overruled bankruptcy court and district court decisions written by a single judge, and
overruled Supreme Court decisions, which predictably have a much higher rate of separate
writing on account of the larger size of the Court and its stronger tradition of separate writing,
have been excluded from this analysis. If these additional cases are included, however, the chi-
square test still fails to establish statistically significant differences between the groups.
122. p = .16 (chi-square).
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TABLE 7: Overruled and Control Groups by Chapter
Chapter Control Group Overruled Cases Difference*
Chapter 7 29% 37% +8%
Chapter 9 0% 2% +2%
Chapter 11 61% 46% -15%
Chapter 12 2% 0% -2%
Chapter 13 8% 16% +8%
Sum
N 51** 57** 108
* Differences among chapters not significant, p = .28 (chi-square).
** Two cases (one in each group) excluded because the chapter could not be determined
from the opinion or because cases under different chapters had been consolidated on
appeal.
Note that twice as many Chapter 13 cases appear in the over-
ruled group as in the control. The chi-square test establishes that the
probability of this result occurring is between .28 (including Chapters
9 and 12 data) and .22 (excluding Chapters 9 and 12 data). While the
disproportion observed in the number of overruled Chapter 13 cases
therefore fails to meet conventional standards of statistical signifi-
cance, the observed disproportion is substantial enough to warrant
further investigation. One reason to expect an over-representation of
Chapter 13 cases in the overruled group is that Chapter 13 cases are
less likely to be appealed to the Courts of Appeals and therefore un-
der-represented in a control group drawn exclusively from such cases,
while the converse may be true for Chapter 11 cases given the gener-
ally greater stakes involved. In reviewing an early draft of this Arti-
cle, Judge Lisa Hill Fenning suggested that another reason to expect
more superseding amendments arising out of the Chapter 13 cases is
that Chapter 13 was engrafted upon a Bankruptcy Code drafted pri-
marily with reference to the long experience and predominant influ-
ence of sophisticated business bankruptcy professionals and with rela-
tively little input from consumer-oriented professionals. I suspect
there is something to this suggestion.
IV. CONCLUSION
The evidence drawn from the last twenty years' experience in-
terpreting the Bankruptcy Code is that textualism disproportionately
leads to bad decisions (from the perspective of the policy preferences of
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the political branches) that result in costly, time-consuming, and inef-
ficient statutory overrulings.
My infant son Eli Javier and I play blocks together. While Eli
watches, I meticulously construct a tower out of his blocks. He then
crawls over and knocks the tower over. I then rebuild it and Eli then
knocks it over again. And again, again, and again. Notwithstanding
my substantial advantages in size, experience, and (arguably) coordi-
nation, Eli always wins the game because it is much easier to knock
over a tower of blocks than to build one. There are risks to bystanders
in this game. Often one of Eli's older sisters (or, worst case scenario,
his mother) will stumble over the blocks strewn over the family room
floor. Although Eli and I nevertheless find this an amusing little
game, I hold out high hopes that some day we can actually work to-
gether to build a tower that remains standing.
And I hold out the same hopes for Congress and the courts with
respect to federal bankruptcy policy. In general, these instances of
statutory overrulings in which I have immersed myself are examples
of Congress unnecessarily rebuilding some part of the structure of
bankruptcy policy that a court has knocked over, sometimes rather
casually. It may be amusing to watch Congress fumble around trying
to rewrite the statute to get it right. But in the meantime debtors,
creditors, and their lawyers must walk gingerly among the ruins.
If we can agree that Congress and the courts should work to-
gether to achieve the most sensible and effective statutory scheme
possible, the evidence is that over time pragmatic interpretation ap-
pears more likely to lead to that result than textualism. Analysis of
random bankruptcy cases indicates that pragmatic interpretive meth-
ods continue to be the norm in the bankruptcy field. Comparison of the
random cases to the overruled ones indicates that pragmatism should
remain the dominant mode of statutory construction, at least in bank-
ruptcy cases, even though many nonbankruptcy scholars and judges
have assumed or suggested that bankruptcy was one area where tex-
tualism might actually yield better results than pragmatism because




Bankruptcy Cases Superseded by Statute 1979-1998
* Indicates amendment failed in whole or in part or left related issues
unresolved or had unintended consequences.
t Indicates five or more years elapsed between leading decision and
amendment.
A. Textualist
"1. Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 (1993) (oversecured home mortga-
gee entitled to interest on arrearages including compound inter-
est not available under mortgage terms), superseded by Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 305, 108 Stat.
4106, 4134 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(d), 1222(d), 1322(e)
(1994)).
*2. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552
(1990) (criminal restitution obligations dischargeable under
Chapter 13), superseded by Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-647, § 3102(b), 104 Stat. 4789, 4916 (codified at 11
U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) (1994)), and re-amended by Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 302, 108 Stat. 4106,
4132 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3) (1994)).
3. United States Trustee v. Columbia Gas Sys. Inc. (In re Colum-
bia Gas Sys., Inc.), 33 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 1994) (absent bond trus-
tee must invest in government securities or insured deposit ac-
counts), superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-394, §210, 108 Stat. 4106, 4125 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 345(b) (1994)).
t*4. Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto Dealers' Ass'n, 997 F.2d 581
(9th Cir. 1993) (state regulators asserting control over property
of the estate not excepted from automatic stay), superseded by
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Appropriations Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 603, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-86 (codi-
fied at 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (Supp. 1998)).
*5. City Nat'l. Bank v. Chabot (In re Chabot), 992 F.2d 891 (9th Cir.
1993) (judgment lien burdening future appreciation of exempt
property does not impair exemption), superseded by Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 303, 108 Stat. 4106,
4132 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1994)).
t6. Ford Motor Credit Corp. v. Dixon (In re Dixon), 885 F.2d 327
(6th Cir. 1989) (judicial lien does not impair homestead exemp-
930 [Vol. 53:887
TEXTUALISM'S FAIL URES
tion), superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-394, § 310, 108 Stat. 4106, 4137 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(f) (1994)).
t*7. Central Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Liming (In re Liming), 797
F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1986) (non-purchase money lien in tractor
avoidable without regard to value), superseded by Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 310, 108 Stat. 4106,
4137 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1994)).
*8. Johnson v. Vanguard Holding Corp. (In re Johnson), 708 F.2d
865 (2d Cir. 1983) (successive Chapter 13 filings within six
months permitted notwithstanding failure to appear in first
case), superseded by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 301, 98 Stat. 333,
352 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(g) (1994)).
9. In re Covey, 650 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1981) (creditors holding dis-
puted claims may join involuntary petition), superseded by
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 426, 98 Stat. 333, 369 (codified at 11
U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (1994)).
*10. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.
1980) (real estate foreclosure sale avoidable as constructive
fraud), failed attempt to supersede by Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 421(i),
98 Stat. 333, 368, (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1994)), over-
ruled by BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
*11. In re New Valley Corp., 168 B.R. 73 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994)
(unimpaired claims against solvent estate not entitled to post-
petition interest), superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 213(d), 108 Stat. 4106, 4126
(deleting former 11 U.S.C. § 1124(3) (1994)).
12. In re Hausladen, 146 B.R. 557 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992) (en banc)
(tardily filed claims allowed), superseded by Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 213(a), 108 Stat. 4106, 4125-
26 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(b)(9) & 726(a)(1) (1994)).
t13. Richardson v. Chrysler First Fin. Servs. Corp. (In re
Richardson), 102 B.R. 254 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989)
(reaffirmation hearing required even if attorney files declaration
in conformity with § 524(c)), superseded by Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, §103, 108 Stat. 4106, 4108
(codified 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1994)).
*14. Pennsylvania Peer Review Org. v. United States (In re
Pennsylvania Peer Review Org.), 50 B.R. 640 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1985) (personal services contract may not be assumed by debtor
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in possession without nondebtor party's consent), superseded by
Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family
Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 283(e),
100 Stat. 3088, 3117 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (1994)).
t*15. In re Lyons Mach. Co., Inc., 28 B.R. 600 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1983)
(creditors' committee members not entitled to expense
reimbursement), superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 110, 108 Stat. 4106, 4113 (codified at 11
U.S.C. § 503(b)(3) (1994)).
16. In re Spirited, Inc., 23 B.R. 1004 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982)
(shareholders retaining their shares are deemed to reject
because plan does not provide "payment or compensation" to
interest holders), superseded by Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 510(d), 98
Stat. 333, 386 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1126(g) (1994)).
17. In re Wahl, 14 B.R. 153 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1981) (each knife,
fork and spoon in sterling silver set is an item individually
subject to $200 limit without aggregate limit), superseded by
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 306, 98 Stat. 333, 353 (codified at 11
U.S.C. § 522(d) (1994)).
18. Buffalo -Sav. Bank v. Marston Enters., Inc. (In re Marston
Enters., Inc.), 13 B.R. 514 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (presumed
acceptance of plan is rebuttable if majority of unimpaired class
vote to reject plan), superseded by Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, §§ 510,
512(a)(9), 98 Stat. 333, 387 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126(f),
1129(a)(10) (1994)).
*19. Government Nat'l Mortgage Corp. v. Adana Mortgage Bankers,
Inc. (In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc.), 12 B.R. 977 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1980) (personal services contract may not be assumed
by debtor-in-possession without nondebtor party's consent), su-
perseded by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 362, 98 Stat. 333, 361-63
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (1994)).
B. Primarily Textualist
t*20. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.,
484 U.S. 365 (1988) (no post-petition adequate protection
payments to undersecured creditor based on use value of
collateral), superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub.
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L. No. 103-394, § 218(b), 108 Stat. 4106, 4128 (codified at 11
U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) (1994)).
21. United States v. Vecchio (In re Vecchio), 20 F.3d 555 (2d Cir.
1994) (late filed priority claims retain priority status subject to
equitable discretion of bankruptcy court not to compel
disgorgement), superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 213, 108 Stat. 4106, 4125-26 (codified at
11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) (1994)).
22. Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. DeSeno (In re DeSeno), 17 F.3d 642
(3d Cir. 1994) (home mortgage may be modified under Ch.11
plan), superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-394, § 206, 108 Stat. 4106, 4123 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1123(b)(5) (1994)).
23. In re Rosteck, 899 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1990) (post-petition
condominium assessments dischargeable), superseded by Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 309, 108 Stat.
4106, 4137 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (1994)).
t24. Lincoln Sav. Bank v. Suffolk County (In re Parr Meadows
Racing Ass'n), 880 F.2d 1540 (2d Cir. 1989) (post-petition tax
liens void under § 362(a)), superseded by Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 116, 108 Stat. 4106, 4119
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(9) (1994)).
t*25. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989)
(creditor holding insider guarantee subject to extended
preference period as the initial transferee of insider preference),
superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
394, § 202, 108 Stat. 4106, 4121 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 550(c)
(1994)).
t*26. Goldrich v. New York State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp. (In re
Goldrich), 771 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1985) (state agency may deny
student loan application based on prior bankruptcy discharge of
other loans), superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 313, 108 Stat. 4106, 4140 (codified at 11
U.S.C. § 525(c) (1994)).
t*27. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 39
B.R. 974 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (PBGC ineligible to serve on
creditors' committees), superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 106, 108 Stat. 4106, 4111 (codified
at 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (1994)).
28. City of Akron v. Jackson (In re Jackson), 77 B.R. 120 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1987) (damages arising out of drunk driving accident
dischargeable unless tort action commenced prepetition),
superseded by Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L.
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No. 101-581, § 2, 104 Stat. 2865, 2865 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 523(a)(9) & 1328(a)(2) (1994)), and Crime Control Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3102(a), 104 Stat. 4789, 4916
(codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(9) & 1328(a)(2) (1994)).
t29. Swiss Air Transp. Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc. (In re
Continental Airlines Corp.), 57 B.R. 854 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985)
(§ 1110 does not protect non-purchase money security interest),
superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
394, § 201(a), 108 Stat. 4106, 4119 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1110
(1994)).
*30. In re Broadcast Mgmt. Corp., 36 B.R. 519 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1983) (creditors' committee counsel may not represent
individual creditor in same proceeding), superseded by Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, § 324, 98 Stat. 333, 358 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1103(b) (1994)).
*31. Sombrero Reef Club, Inc. v. Allman (In re Sombrero Reef Club,
Inc.), 18 B.R. 612 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (timeshare contracts
may be rejected and timeshare owner divested of right to use
premises), superseded by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, §§ 402-404, 98 Stat.
333, 367 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(h)(i) (1994)).
C. Both Textualist and Pragmatic
*32. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992) (federal
government immune from suit for affirmative monetary
recovery), superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-394, § 113, 108 Stat. 4106, 4117 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 106(a) (1994)).
*33. First Nat'l Fidelity Corp. v. Perry, 945 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1991)
(Chapter 13 debtor may not restructure home mortgage debt
over life of Chapter 13 plan even if balance becomes due during
plan period), superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 301, 108 Stat. 4106, 4131 (codified at 11
U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1994)).
34. Lugo v. Paulsen, 886 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1989) (insurance
surcharge on account of drunk driving nondischargeable),
superseded by Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-581, § 2, 104 Stat. 2865, 2865 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 523(a)(9) & 1328(a)(2) (1994)), and Crime Control Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3102(a), 104 Stat. 4789, 4916
(codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(9) & 1328(a)(2) (1994)).
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*35. Gusam Restaurant Corp. v. Speciner (In re Gusam Restaurant
Corp.), 737 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1984) (court lacks power to sua
sponte convert Chapter 11 case to Chapter 7), superseded by
Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family
Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 203, 100
Stat. 3088, 3097 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994)).
*36. Foster v. Heitkamp (In re Foster), 670 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1982)
(when a debtor chooses to disburse mortgage payments directly
to a mortgagee rather than through the trustee, trustee's
percentage fee applicable, although it may be reduced in
discretion of court), superseded by Bankruptcy Judges, United
States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 230, 100 Stat. 3088, 3103 (codified at 11
U.S.C. § 1326(b) (1994)).
37. Cannady v. Wilson (In re Cannady), 653 F.2d 210 (5th Cir.
1981) (spouses may separately elect state and federal
exemptions), superseded by Bankruptcy Amendments and Fed-
eral Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 306(a), 98 Stat.
333, 353 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1994)).
t*38. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young),
152 B.R. 939 (D. Minn. 1993) (tithes voidable under § 548 as
constructively fraudulent), rev'd, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996),
failed attempt to supersede by Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, declared un-
constitutional by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997),
superseded by Bankruptcy Religious Liberty and Charitable Do-
nation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, §§ 2-3, 112
Stat. 517, 517-18 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) & 548 (Supp.
1998)).
t39. Korvettes, Inc. v. Sanyo Elec., Inc. (In re Korvettes, Inc.), 67
B.R. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (debtor in possession not subject to two
year statute of limitations under § 546(a)), superseded by Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 216, 108 Stat.
4106, 4126 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) (1994)).
*40. In re Carlton Restaurant, Inc., 151 B.R. 353 (Bankr. E.D. Pa
1993) (tenant may hold premises under rejected lease terms
only by remaining in physical possession), superseded by Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 205, 108 Stat.
4106, 4122 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (1994)).
41. In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991)
(express state authorization for municipal corporation to file
under Chapter 9 not required), superseded by Bankruptcy Re-
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form Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 402, 108 Stat. 4106,
4141 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (1994)).
*42. In re Baldwin-United Corp., 38 B.R. 802 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1984) (FDIC ineligible to serve on creditors' committees), super-
seded by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 499, 98 Stat. 333, 384 (codified at
11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (1994)).
*43. Gunther v. Kuepper (In re Kuepper), 36 B.R. 680 (Bankr. E.D.
Wis. 1983) (drunk driving damage claim dischargeable), super-
seded by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 371, 98 Stat. 333, 364 (codified at
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (1994)), and re-amended by Criminal
Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581, § 2, 104
Stat. 2865, 2865 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(9) & 1328(a)
(1994)), and Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647,
§ 3102(a), 104 Stat. 4789, 4916 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 523(a)(9) & 1328(a) (1994) and re-amended by Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 221, 108 Stat. 4106,
4129 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(9) & 1328(a) (1994)).
44. In re Williams, 9 B.R. 228 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) (liens do not
survive discharge under § 524(a)), superseded by Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, § 308(a), 98 Stat. 333, 354 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 524(a)(2) (1994)).
D. Primarily Pragmatic
t*45. Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S.
96 (1989) (Congress failed to abrogate state sovereign immunity
with unmistakeably clear statutory language), superseded by
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 113, 108
Stat. 4106, 4117 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 106 (1994)), rendered
unconstitutional by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996).
*46. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984) (collective
bargaining agreement may be rejected based upon balance of
the equities, after reasonable efforts to negotiate a modification
have failed), superseded by Bankruptcy Amendments and Fed-
eral Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 541, 98 Stat.
333, 390 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1994)).
*47. Sullivan v. Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc., 963
F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1992) (§ 106(a) implied waiver of sovereign
immunity applies when federal government recoups
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overpayments without filing proof of claim), superseded by
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 113, 108
Stat. 4106, 4117 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 106(b) (1994)).
t*48. In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370 (3d Cir. 1987) (Chapter 13 debtor
may not reinstate home mortgage after foreclosure judgment
entered), superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-394, § 301, 108 Stat. 4106, 4131 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1322(c)(1) (1994)).
E. Pragmatic
t*49. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979) (mortgagee's
security interest in rents determined by state law), superseded
by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394,
§ 214(a), 108 Stat. 4106, 4126 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)
(1994)).
50. In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991) (property acquired
during Chapter 13 case remains property of estate after
conversion to Chapter 7), superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 311, 108 Stat. 4106, 4138
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 348(f) (1994)).
t51. Simonson v. First Bank of Greater Pittston (In re Simonson),
758 F.2d 103 (3rd Cir. 1985) (intervening judicial lien not
avoidable if exempt property overencumbered by nonavoidable
consensual liens), superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 303, 108 Stat. 4106, 4132 (codified
at 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1994)).
t52. Stuart v. Pingree (In re AFCO Dev. Corp.), 65 B.R. 781 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1986) (statute of limitations runs from the appointment
of each successive bankruptcy trustee), disapproved by In re
CVA Assocs., 171 B.R. 122 (D. Utah 1994), superseded by Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 216, 108 Stat.
4106, 4126 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) (1994)).
F. Unable To Determine
*53. Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 756 F.2d 1043
(4th Cir. 1985) (nondebtor licensee divested of rights to licensed
intellectual property upon rejection), superseded by Intellectual
Property Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-506, § 1, 102
Stat. 2538, 2538 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (1994)).
t*54. Dallas-Fort Worth Reg'l Airport Bd. v. Braniff Airways, 26 B.R.
628 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982) (debtor not required to accept or
2000] 937
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
reject leases for airport facilities within a specified period of
time from filing), superseded by Rail Safety Enforcement and
Review Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-365, § 19(b), 106 Stat. 972,
982 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365(d) (1994)).
*55. In re Bogosian, 112 B.R. 2 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990) (Bankruptcy
Rule 4001(a)(2) time limits not enforceable in lift stay
proceeding), superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-394, § 101, 108 Stat. 4106, 4107 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(e) (1994)).
t*56. In re Ashkenazy Enters., Inc., 94 B.R. 645 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1986) (hotel revenues are not real property rents under
§ 552(b)), superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-394, § 214, 108 Stat. 4106, 4126 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(b)(2) (1994)).
57. In re Murray, 5 B.R. 732 (Bankr. D. Md. 1980) (no good faith
defense for purchaser of lands located within county of
bankruptcy case under § 549(c)), superseded by Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, § 464(c), 98 Stat. 333, 379 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 549(c)
(1994)).
*58. In re Utter, 3 B.R. 369 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1980) (separate
classification of co-debtor obligations not permitted under
Chapter 13 plan), superseded by Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 316, 98
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Coding Instructions
I. Case name: Use debtor's name only if caption is "In re" or
' Matter of." Otherwise, use usual short title caption (_v._) omit-
ting "et al.", "et ux.", etc.
II. Cite: Use U.S. cite for Supreme Court, unless only S.Ct. or
U.S.L.W. is available. Use F.2d or F.3d cite as applicable for published
USCA decisions. Use B.R. cite for all published BAP, bankruptcy court
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ing analyzed, code as a case under the chapter it has been converted
to, unless the issue being litigated arises only in cases filed under the
chapter converted from (i.e. if the question is the construction of
§ 1141, code as Chapter 11 even if the case has already been converted
to Chapter 7).
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party mark Not Applicable. If a non-debtor, non-trustee party pre-
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IX. Overruled by: Be sure to cite all applicable amendments.
20001 939
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
X. Holding: Try and keep it to one short descriptive sentence
of the key proposition of law decided.
XI. Interpretive method:
1. Textualist. Code for decisions that make the language of the
statute dispositive notwithstanding competing interpretations (if any)
based upon legislative history, past practice under the Bankruptcy Act
or policy.
2. Primarily but not exclusively textual. Code for decisions that
give decisive weight to the language of the statute, but cite as suppor-
tive interpretive sources relevant legislative history, past practice, or
policy.
3. Relies on both textual and nontextual sources. Code for deci-
sions that rely on both statutory language and relevant legislative his-
tory, past practice, or policy as mutually supporting rationales for the
decision.
4. Primarily but not exclusively nontextual. Code for decisions
that give decisive weight to relevant legislative history, past practice,
or policy, but cite the language of the statute as supportive of the deci-
sion.
5. Non-Textualist. Code for decisions that make legislative his-
tory, past practice, or policy dispositive notwithstanding competing
interpretations (if any) based upon the language of the statute.
6. Result controlled by precedent. Decisions dictated by con-
trolling precedent from the same or a higher court.
7. Unable to determine. Please note in Comments why it was
not possible to classify the interpretative method.
XII. Efficacy of overruling:
1. Failed completely. Congress indicates an intention to over-
rule a particular case or line of cases in the course of enacting an
amendment to the Code, but subsequent litigation makes clear the
statutory change failed to effect the result. An example is the failed
1984 attempt to overturn Durrett.
2. Failed partially. Congress indicates an intention to overrule
a particular case or line of cases in the course of enacting an amend-
ment to the Code, but subsequent litigation makes clear the statutory
change failed to fully achieve the result. An example is the very lim-
ited success of § 521(2) in requiring debtors to elect redemption, reaf-
firmation or surrender of collateral.
3a. Succeeded narrowly, but left unresolved issues. Congress
successfully overrules a particular holding, but closely related issues
that are arguably controlled by the reasoning, but not the holding of
the overruled case remain unresolved. The overturning of Levit v. In-
gersoll Rand by the enactment of § 550(c) is an example.
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3b. Succeeded narrowly, but left unintended consequences.
Congress successfully overrules a particular holding, but in the course
of doing so creates new issues in unrelated areas. An example is the
overruling of New Valley by the deletion of § 1124(3).
4. Succeeded completely. Decision overturned by amendment,
cleanly, and with no apparent unintended consequences.
5. Overruling appears inadvertent. Amendment has the effect
of overturning a line of cases, but it is unclear whether Congress in-
tended that consequence. An example may be the deletion of the 45-
day requirement for the ordinary course of business defense,
§ 547(c)(2), discussed in Union Bank v. Wolas.
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(circle all that apply)
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Randomly Selected Bankruptcy Cases on Certiorari in the
Supreme Court of the United States, 1982-1998
A. Textualist
1. In re Merchants Grain, Inc. 93 F.3d 1347 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. de-
nied, 519 U.S. 1111 (1997).
2. Hall Fin. Group, Inc. v. DP Partners Ltd. Partnership (In re DP
Partners Ltd. Partnership), 106 F.3d 667 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 815 (1997).
3. Fukatomi v. United States Trustee (In re Bibo, Inc.), 76 F.3d 256
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 817 (1996).
4. Palmer v. Levy (In re Levy), 951 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 504 U.S. 985 (1992), overruled by Cohen v. De La Cruz,
523 U.S. 213 (1998).
5. United States v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. (In re Mansfield
Tire & Rubber Co.), 942 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub
nom., Krugliak v. United States, 502 U.S. 1092 (1992), overruled
by United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators, 518 U.S. 213
(1996).
B. Primarily Textualist
6. Frieouf v. United States (In re Frieouf), 938 F.2d 1099 (10th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1091 (1992).
7. Colony Square Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. (In re Colony Square
Co.), 779 F.2d 653 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 824 (1986).
8. Cheadle v. Appleatchee Riders Ass'n (In re Lovitt), 757 F.2d 1035
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 849 (1985).
9. Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom., United States v. Security Indus.
Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
C. Both Textualist and Pragmatic
10. Taffi v. United States (In re Taffi), 96 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1996)
(en banc), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1103 (1997).
11. United Mine Workers of Am. 1992 Benefit Plan v. Leckie
Smokeless Coal Co. (In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co.), 99 F.3d 573
(4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1118 (1997).
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12. Clark v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Meridith Hoffman
Partners), 12 F.3d 1549 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S.
1206 (1994).
13. Hucke v. Oregon, 992 F.2d 950 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 862 (1993).
14. In re Wade, 991 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
870 (1993).
15. Carolco Television, Inc. v. National Broad. Co. (In re De
Laurentlis Entertainment Group, Inc.), 963 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 918 (1992).
16. Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Looney (In re Looney), 823 F.2d 788 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987).
17. Cash Currency Exch., Inc. v. Shine (In re Cash Currency Exch.,
Inc.), 762 F.2d 542 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Fryel v. Cash
Currency Exch., Inc., 474 U.S. 904 (1985).
18. Ohio v. Kovacs (In re Kovacs), 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd,
469 U.S. 274 (1985).
19. United States v. Southern States Motor Inns, Inc. (In re Southern
States Motor Inns, Inc.), 709 F.2d 647 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984).
D. Primarily Pragmatic
20. Cohen v. De La Cruz (In re Cohen), 106 F.3d 52 (3rd Cir. 1997),
aff'd, 523 U.S. 213 (1998).
21. HUD v. Cost Control Mktg. & Sales Mgmt., 64 F.3d 920 (4th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1187 (1996).
22. Checkers Drive-In Restaurants v. Commissioner of Patents &
Trademarks, 51 F.3d 1078 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 866
(1995).
23. T-H New Orleans Ltd. Partnership v. Financial Sec. Assurance,
Inc. (In re T-H New Orleans Ltd. Partnership), 10 F.3d 1099 (5th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1083 (1994).
24. Bonner Mall Partnership v. United States Bancorp Mortgage Co.
(In re Bonner Mall Partnership), 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
dismissed as moot, 513 U.S. 18 (1994), overruled by Bank of Am.
Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership, 119
S. Ct. 1411 (1999).
25. Besing v. Hawthrone (In re Besing), 981 F.2d 1488 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 821 (1993).
26. Shearson Lehman Mortgage Corp. v. Laguna (In re Laguna), 944
F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 966 (1992), over-
ruled by Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 (1993), superseded by Bank-
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ruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 305, 108 Stat.
4106, 4134 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(d), 1222(d), 1322(e)
(1994)).
27. Jones v. Atchison (In re Atchison), 925 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 860 (1991).
28. Snow v. Green (In re Snow), 899 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 952 (1991).
29. New York Typographical Union No. 6 v. Royal Composing Room,
Inc. (In re Royal Composing Room, Inc.), 848 F.2d 345 (2d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989).
30. Shell Oil Co. v. Waldron (In re Waldron), 785 F.2d 936 (11th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 478 U.S. 1028 (1986).
E. Pragmatic
31. Coleman Oil Co. v. Circle K Corp. (In re Circle K Corp.), 127 F.3d
904 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1148 (1998).
32. Capital Communications Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow (In re
Boodrow), 126 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1117
(1998).
33. Gendreau v. Gendreau (In re Gendreau), 122 F.3d 815 (9th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1005 (1998).
34. Barakat v. Life Ins. Co. (In re Barakat), 99 F.3d 1520 (9th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1143 (1997).
35. In re Prince, 85 F.3d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1040
(1996).
36. Jobin v. MacKay (In re M&L Bus. Mach. Co.), 84 F.3d 1330 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1040 (1996).
37. In re Terry Ltd. Partnership, 27 F.3d 241 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom., Invex Holdings v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 948
(1994).
38. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re BFP), 974 F.2d 1144 (9th
Cir. 1992), affl'd, 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
39. Boston Post Rd. Ltd. Partnership v. FDIC (In re Boston Post Rd.
Ltd. Partnership), 21 F.3d 477 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1109 (1995).
40. Texas Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Licht (In re Pengo Indus., Inc.),
962 F.2d 543 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1000 (1992).
41. Johnson v. Barnhill (In re Antweil), 931 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1991),
aff'd, 503 U.S. 393 (1992).
42. Home State Bank v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 904 F.2d 563 (10th
Cir. 1990), rev'd, 501 U.S. 78 (1991).
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43. Owen v. Owen (In re Owen), 877 F.2d 44 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd,
500 U.S. 305 (1991).
44. Begier v. IRS, 878 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1989), aff'd, 496 U.S. 53
(1990).
45. Oberg v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 828 F.2d
1023 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 969 (1988).
46. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc. (In re Ron Pair Enters.,
Inc.), 828 F.2d 367 (6th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
47. In re Armstrong, 812 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
925 (1987).
48. A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 876 (1986).
49. Torres v. Eastlick (In re North Am. Coin & Currency, Ltd.), 767
F.2d 1573, as modified 774 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1083 (1986).
F. Result Controlled by Precedent
50. Bondholder Comm. v. Williamson County (In re Brentwood
Outpatient), 43 F.3d 256 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1096 (1995).
51. Commonwealth Nat'l Bank v. United States (In re Ashe), 712 F.2d
864 (3d Cir. 1983) (on remand), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984).
G. Unable To Determine
52. Fobian v. West Farm Credit Bank (In re Fobian), 951 F.2d 1149
(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1220 (1992).
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